Cognitive pathways to belief in karma and belief in God by White, Cindel J.M. et al.
COGNITIVE PATHWAYS TO KARMA AND GOD 1 
Cognitive pathways to belief in karma and belief in God  
Cindel J. M. White1, Aiyana K. Willard2, Adam Baimel3, Ara Norenzayan1 
1 Psychology Department, The University of British Columbia, Canada 
2 Centre for Culture and Evolution, Department of Life Sciences, Brunel University London, UK 
3 Department of Psychology, Health and Professional Development, Oxford Brookes 
University, UK  
 
Author Note 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Cindel J. M. White, 
Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, 2136 West Mall, Vancouver, BC 
V6T 1Z4.  Email: cwhite@psych.ubc.ca 
 
COGNITIVE PATHWAYS TO KARMA AND GOD 2 
Abstract 
Supernatural beliefs are ubiquitous around the world, and mounting evidence indicates 
that these beliefs partly rely on intuitive, cross-culturally recurrent cognitive processes.  
Specifically, past research has focused on humans’ intuitive tendency to perceive minds as part of 
the cognitive foundations of belief in a personified God — an agentic, morally concerned 
supernatural entity. However, much less is known about belief in karma – another culturally 
widespread but ostensibly non-agentic supernatural entity reflecting ethical causation across 
reincarnations.  In two studies and four high-powered samples, including mostly-Christian 
Canadians and mostly-Hindu Indians (Study 1, N = 2006) and mostly-Christian Americans and 
Singaporean Buddhists (Study 2, N = 1752), we provide the first systematic empirical 
investigation of the cognitive intuitions underlying various forms of belief in karma.  We used 
path analyses to (1) replicate tests of the previously documented cognitive predictors of belief in 
God, (2) test whether this same network of variables predicts belief in karma, and (3) examine 
the relative contributions of cognitive and cultural variables to both sets of beliefs.  We found 
that cognitive tendencies toward intuitive thinking, mentalizing, dualism, and teleological 
thinking predicted a variety of beliefs about karma—including morally-laden, non-agentic, and 
agentic conceptualizations—above and beyond the variability explained by cultural learning 
about karma across cultures.  These results provide further evidence for an independent role for 
both culture and cognition in supporting diverse types of supernatural beliefs in distinct cultural 
contexts. 
 
Keywords:  Karma, God, Mentalizing, Intuitive Thinking 
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Cognitive pathways to belief in karma and belief in God 
All around the world people believe in a myriad of gods, spirits, and other supernatural 
forces that intervene in human affairs, cause misfortune, bring blessings, and maintain justice 
and order in the universe.  One prominent explanation for the cross-cultural and historical 
ubiquity of these beliefs is that recurrent features of human cognition make these particular 
forms of supernatural beliefs intuitively compelling (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004;  Barrett, 2000, 
2010; Bering, 2010; Boyer, 2001; Guthrie, 1993).  The tendency to consider unseen mental states 
as a source of observable behaviour, the expectation that minds are fundamentally different and 
separate from physical bodies, and the attribution of function to natural phenomena make it easy 
to accept culturally-transmitted information about unseen, disembodied supernatural agents that 
intervene in life events and regulate human behavior.  Conversely, there is some evidence that 
individuals who struggle to understand human minds, who do not espouse dualistic and 
teleological intuitions, or who tend to override their intuitive reactions in favor of more 
analytical thinking tend to be less committed to a variety of supernatural and religious beliefs 
(e.g., Gervais et al., 2018; Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016; Riekki, Lindeman, & 
Lipsanen, 2013; Willard, Cingl, & Norenzayan, 2020; Willard & Norenzayan, 2013; but see also 
Farias et al., 2017; Lindeman, Svedholm-Häkkinen, & Lipsanen, 2015; Maij et al., 2017; 
Sanchez, Sundermeier, Gray, & Calin-Jageman, 2017). 
Past research regarding the cognitive foundations of religious beliefs has largely 
investigated the predictors of belief in God, especially in historically-Christian cultural contexts 
(for a recent exception comparing conceptions of Hindu gods and the Islamic God, see Shtulman, 
Foushee, Barner, Dunham, & Srinivasan, 2019; see also Baimel, 2019).  While God beliefs are 
prevalent and central to many people’s lives around the globe, this reflects only a subset of the 
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world’s diversity in religious beliefs (Norenzayan, 2016). In two studies of diverse samples, we 
investigated the applicability of cognitive theories of supernatural beliefs to the culturally 
widespread belief in karma and compared these patterns to the cognitive predictors of belief in 
God.   
Central to Hindu and Buddhist traditions with over 1.5 billion contemporary followers 
(Bronkhorst, 2011; Pew Research Center, 2015), karma is an ostensibly non-theistic belief that 
moral actions affect the likelihood of future good and bad outcomes, even when the connection 
between actions and outcomes is causally-opaque or occurs across unobservably-long timescales 
in the cycle of reincarnation. Beyond Hinduism and Buddhism, karma is also prevalent in 
Traditional Chinese Religions, Sikhism, Jainism, and many other smaller religious groups.  In 
countries were Buddhism or Hinduism are prevalent, karmic beliefs are also widespread and 
closely intertwined with moral values in everyday contexts (e.g., interpersonal relationships, 
business ethics), even among individuals who do not formally identify as Hindu or Buddhist 
(Berniūnas et al., 2020; Mulla & Krishnan, 2014; Willard, Baimel, et al., 2020).  Belief in karma 
is also common among the rapidly growing Western “spiritual but not religious”, even though 
most of these individuals are not raised in karma-oriented religious traditions (White, 
Norenzayan, & Schaller, 2019). These considerations make belief in karma an important but 
under-studied aspect of the world’s theodiversity (Norenzayan, 2016; C. White et al., 2016). 
Despite its prevalence and cultural importance, karma remains remarkably under-researched 
compared to other areas in the cognitive science of religion.  In two studies across four cultural 
contexts, we provide one of the first systematic empirical investigations of the cognitive 
predictors of belief in karma, compare these to the predictors of belief in God, and evaluate 
several theoretical explanations. 
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1.1 Intuitions supporting belief in God 
There is mounting evidence that many supernatural beliefs partly draw on intuitive 
cognitive processes that are widespread among children and adults from many cultures, and that 
there are reliable associations between individual differences in these cognitive tendencies and 
individual differences in supernatural beliefs. Individuals who tend to trust their intuitions 
express somewhat stronger belief in God, while those more willing to engage in analytic thinking 
tend to be somewhat more skeptical. While these associations are small in magnitude (with a 
typical effect size of about r =.18), and there are lively debates about their robustness (e.g., 
Gervais et al., 2018; Maij et al., 2017; Stagnaro, Ross, Pennycook, & Rand, 2019), they have 
emerged in high-powered samples, in several cultural contexts, and are robust to demographic 
controls and various types of measurement  (Baimel, White, & Norenzayan, 2019; Gervais et al., 
2018; Pennycook et al., 2016; Stagnaro, et al, 2019). Additionally, belief in God is predicted by 
cognitive tendencies for mentalizing (perceiving and engaging with other human minds, Frith & 
Frith, 2012); mind-body dualism (thinking about minds as separate and independent from 
physical bodies, Astuti & Harris, 2008; Chudek, McNamara, Birch, Bloom, & Henrich, 2018; 
Cohen, Burdett, Knight, & Barrett, 2011; Järnefelt, Canfield, & Kelemen, 2015; Slingerland & 
Chudek, 2011); and teleological thinking (reasoning about the purpose and intentional design of 
artifacts and biological entities, Banerjee & Bloom, 2014; Heywood & Bering, 2014; Kelemen, 
2004; Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; for comprehensive path models of these relationships, see 
Willard et al., 2020; Willard & Norenzayan, 2013).   
A plausible theoretical explanation for why these particular cognitive variables predict 
belief in God is that believers prototypically view God as an intentional agent, and a willingness 
to engage in mentalizing facilitates commitment to this particular conceptualization of God, 
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while not facilitating commitment to abstract and impersonal conceptualization of God (Baimel, 
2019). Many of the same socio-cognitive processes used to understand interpersonal 
relationships are also used when believers think about God.  Believers often mentally represent 
God as a personified social agent, with many of the same perceptual capabilities, personality 
traits, and moral values that humans possess (Barrett & Keil, 1996; Epley, Converse, Delbosc, 
Monteleone, & Cacioppo, 2009; Heiphetz, Lane, Waytz, & Young, 2016; Purzycki, 2013; 
Shtulman & Lindeman, 2016), and this anthropomorphic view of God coexists and interacts 
with, and may even interfere with, later-acquired beliefs about God’s abstract and superhuman 
qualities (Barlev et al., 2017, 2018, 2019).  Praying to God engages many of the same neural 
regions employed to think about other people’s mental states (Schjoedt et al., 2009; van Elk & 
Aleman, 2017), and believers enter into personal relationships with God, with expectations and 
obligations analogous to those found in interpersonal relationships (Granqvist et al., 2010; Rai & 
Fiske, 2011).   
If engaging with the mind of God utilizes the same mentalizing abilities used to engage 
with human minds, this implies that individuals who struggle to understand human minds will 
also struggle to believe in a personal God.  Consistent with this prediction, self-reported 
mentalizing tendencies have been found to predict stronger belief, whereas the autistic spectrum 
predicts less belief in a personal God (Barnes & Gibson, 2013; Gray et al., 2011; Jack et al., 
2016; Lindeman et al., 2015; Lindeman & Lipsanen, 2016; Łowicki & Zajenkowski, 2019; 
Norenzayan et al., 2012; Wlodarski & Pearce, 2016). Mentalizing tendencies have also been 
found to predict endorsement of mind body dualism and teleological explanations, which in turn 
predict the belief in disembodied supernatural agents like God, theistic explanations for natural 
phenomena, and the perception that life events happen for a reason (Banerjee & Bloom, 2014; 
COGNITIVE PATHWAYS TO KARMA AND GOD 7 
Riekki et al., 2013; Willard & Cingl, 2017; Willard & Norenzayan, 2013, 2017).  In this paper, 
we specifically measure the connection between mentalizing and belief by this last indicator, 
that, in the general neurotypical population, individuals who feel greater willingness and ease in 
thinking about other people’s mental states will hold more dualistic conceptions of the mind-
body relationship and be more likely to imbue natural phenomena and life events with 
intentionality and purpose, and that these tendencies will predict belief in God. 
1.2 Do intuitions also predict belief in karma? 
The evidence that mentalizing—and related cognitive intuitions such as dualism and 
teleological thinking—predicts belief in God is theoretically and empirically justified by 
evidence that God is often perceived as a social agent, thus requiring cognitive abilities for mind 
perception.  However, this perspective makes it unclear what relationship—if any—exists 
between these same cognitive tendencies and belief in ostensibly non-theistic supernatural 
forces.  Karma therefore provides a theoretically interesting test case for cognitive theories of 
supernatural belief because, like belief in God, karma is a culturally-widespread belief about a 
moralizing supernatural force that responds to human actions such that good people experience 
good outcomes and bad people bad outcomes in life (Bronkhorst, 2011). Both God and karma 
reflect belief in culturally-transmitted concepts about supernatural entities that justify why 
people have particular good and bad experiences (Harvey & Callan, 2014; White, Norenzayan, et 
al., 2019; Young, Morris, Burrus, Krishnan, & Regmi, 2011), and reminders of God and karma 
both encourage prosocial behaviour in economic games (White, Kelly, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 
2019). From a cultural evolutionary theoretical perspective, both belief in theistic and non-
theistic forms of supernatural norm-enforcement may have played a role in facilitating increased 
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social complexity over historical time (Norenzayan et al., 2016; Watts et al., 2015; White & 
Norenzayan, 2019). 
 But unlike God, karma is not obviously personified in religious texts or in the thoughts 
and actions of believers.  Instead, karma is often depicted as an impersonal force or if-then law 
that summarizes the causal connection between actions and experiences (Bronkhorst, 2011; 
Daniel, 1983; Wadley, 1983).  For example, practitioners of Hinduism tend to believe in both 
gods and karma, but interact with them in radically different ways.  Though Hindu beliefs and 
practices are extremely diverse and difficult to summarize succinctly, visual depictions of gods 
with human-like bodies are prominent in a majority of Hindu worship. Devotees often have 
personal relationships with their gods, which they express through emotional attachment, 
gestures of respect, and sacrificial offerings; no analogous devotional relationship exists towards 
karma.  Similarly, believers will pray to gods and bargain with them to obtain desired outcomes, 
while the effects of karma are revealed through divination and escaped through penitential 
actions (Aktor, 2012; Fuller, 2004; Young, Morris, Burrus, Krishnan, & Regmi, 2011).   
 Buddhism is also diverse, and while many traditions do not require or even encourage 
belief in gods or other supernatural agents, many individual Buddhists do believe that the world 
is inhabited by a variety of supernatural agents worthy of respect and devotion, and some ascribe 
to Buddha many of the omniscient, punitive, moralistic traits that characterize gods (Berniūnas et 
al., 2020; Purzycki & Holland, 2018; Stanford & Jong, 2019).  In contrast, karma is typically 
characterized as the consequences for one’s actions that are unrelated to divine intervention 
(Bronkhorst, 2011; Gowans, 2014; Willard, Baimel, et al., 2020). Unlike Abrahamic religions, 
afterlife/reincarnation beliefs in Buddhism become moralized through their association with 
karma, not the belief in a moralistic God (Obeyesekere, 2002). 
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Many Hindus and Buddhists clearly interact with gods as personified agents, but it is less 
clear how they interact with karma and if this engages the same intuitions.  What is the 
relationship then, between intuitive cognitive tendencies, mentalizing, and belief in karma? 
Below we outline two theoretically possible relationships, and then present two studies testing 
these predictions alongside a replication of previously reported predictors of belief in God, in 
samples from Canada, the United States, India, and Singapore, which vary in their cultural 
exposure to God and karma beliefs. 
1.2.1 Karma reflects unique intuitions about immanent justice, unrelated to the mind 
perception involved in God beliefs 
One possibility is that belief in karma is the expression of an intuition that is distinct from the 
cognitive processes involved in perceiving minds.  The central element of karmic belief 
systems—that life experiences are causally connected to conceptually-similar past actions—
might reflect (1) a by-product of expectations about interpersonal fairness and justice (Baumard 
et al., 2013; Hallsson et al., 2018) applied outside the constraints of interpersonal relationships, 
and/or (2) an instance of the motivation to maintain belief in a just world (Hafer & Rubel, 2015; 
Lerner, 1980).   
Immanent justice attributions, analogous to karmic causality within one lifetime, have been 
well-documented among Westerners who are willing to state that salient past misdeeds are the 
cause of current misfortune (e.g., Callan, Ellard, & Nicol, 2006; Young, Morris, Burrus, 
Krishnan, & Regmi, 2011) and who are willing to give away money to better their chance of 
obtaining desired future outcomes (Banerjee & Bloom, 2017; Converse et al., 2012).  These 
responses are intuitive: Eye movements anticipate outcomes that are congruent with past moral 
actions (Callan et al., 2013), reaction times slow down when participants report that a bad 
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experience is not caused by a proportionate bad deed (Baumard & Chevallier, 2012), and 
immanent justice attributions are made more frequently when analytical thinking is inhibited by 
a cognitive load manipulation (Callan et al., 2010).  The presence of intuitive karma-like 
judgments among these North American and European samples—who have little exposure to 
theological teachings about karmic forces operating across reincarnations and who often 
explicitly deny karmic causality (White, Norenzayan, et al., 2019)—implies that intuitions about 
karmic justice may be widespread across human populations and are not solely the product of 
cultural learning about socially-sanctioned supernatural concepts (see Baumard & Boyer, 2013).  
Therefore, one plausible hypothesis is that belief in karma will be predicted by intuitive thinking 
tendencies, regardless of whether or not karma is viewed as a purely non-agentic supernatural 
force or a personified supernatural agent, and regardless of whether karma is associated with the 
mentalizing tendencies that predict God beliefs. This claim would also predict that mentalizing 
tendencies will not predict belief in karma.  That is, the underlying cognitive foundations of 
belief in karma may be fundamentally different from those supporting belief in God. 
1.2.2 Mentalizing, dualism, and teleological thinking are implicated in belief in moralized 
reincarnation and the personification of karma 
A second possibility is that mentalizing tendencies, mind-body dualism, and teleological 
thinking predict belief in karma because karmic causality is more than simply an intuition about 
immanent justice.  Mental representations of karma also often involve beliefs about moralized 
reincarnation or metaphorical depictions of karma as a social agent, and this additional content of 
culturally-reinforced explicit belief in karma may recruit mentalizing tendencies. 
First, belief in karma is often intertwined with beliefs about reincarnation.  In Hindu and 
Buddhist theology (Bronkhorst, 2011; Obeyesekere, 2002) and in the self-reports of beliefs about 
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karma (White, Norenzayan, et al., 2019; Willard, Baimel, et al., 2020), karma is typically 
believed to operate over multiple lifetimes across the cycle of reincarnation, and to operate 
especially in the case of moral actions.  Thinking about moralized reincarnation requires (1) 
understanding human morality, including the human intentions and mental states that inform the 
morality of many actions (Gray et al., 2012; Willard, Baimel, et al., 2020; cf. McNamara et al., 
2019), and (2) believing that human minds can continue to exist after death and persist through 
reincarnation in new bodies (C. White, 2015, 2017).  Karma then provides a teleological 
structure for reasoning about one’s own and others’ life experiences. Mentalizing, dualism, and 
teleological thinking might therefore predict belief in karma-as-moralized-reincarnation 
regardless of whether karma—the causal mechanism behind this process—is viewed as a 
personified agent or a non-agentic causal principle.   
Second, despite ambiguity in the theological and anthropological record, believers may, 
at least to some extent, actually conceptualize karma as a supernatural agent rather than an 
abstract force, due to the tendency for people to seek out agentic sources for their suffering (Gray 
& Wegner, 2010). Mind perception provides an intuitively compelling way to understand the 
world, especially for ambiguous stimuli and uncertain causal processes (Epley et al., 2007; Kay 
et al., 2010; Laurin & Kay, 2017; Waytz et al., 2010), and especially when seeking to understand 
the cause of misfortune:  Witnessing suffering often leads to a spontaneous search for social or 
supernatural agents who are responsible for causing harm (Gray & Wegner, 2010; Schein & 
Gray, 2018), and belief in supernatural entities’ moral concerns and their other mentalistic 
qualities tend to co-occur (Purzycki et al., 2012; Purzycki, 2013).  Therefore, when trying to 
explain events caused by karma or making predictions about how karma operates, believers may 
use agentic mental models of karma to understand it.  To address this possibility, we asked 
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participants to report whether karma possesses a variety of agentic characteristics (e.g., whether 
karma “can think” and personality traits like being “forgiving” and “vengeful”) as well as non-
agentic characteristics (e.g., whether karma “is impersonal” and “can be gained and lost”).  This 
allowed us to test whether participants who believe in karma actually deny agentic, personified 
descriptions of karma, and how well the intuitive cognitive tendencies predict different 
conceptualizations of karma.  Specifically, mentalizing and associated cognitive tendencies may 
be more relevant when predicting agentic mental representations of karma than non-agentic 
representations.  
1.3 Rationale for analyses and overview of studies 
In two studies, we investigated how intuitive thinking styles, mentalizing, mind-body 
dualism, and teleological thinking predict belief in karma and belief in God, and whether these 
relationships differ depending on if karma or God is viewed as relevant to human morality, 
agentic and personified, or non-agentic and impersonal. We used path models to test these 
hypotheses about the cognitive predictors of belief in karma and God.  These paths models apply 
structural equation modeling to map the hypothesized inter-relationships between multiple 
cognitive variables as predictors of supernatural beliefs, and test whether the hypothesized model 
is a good fit to the pattern of covariances observed in the data (Kline, 2010).  Specifically, in 
each model, we test how various beliefs about karma or God are indirectly predicted by intuitive 
thinking and mentalizing tendencies, via individual differences in mind-body dualism, 
teleological perceptions of life events, and teleological thinking about nature (i.e., individual 
differences that are intuitively compelling and supported by mentalizing tendencies, but are more 
directly relevant to God and karma beliefs than one’s general intuitive and mentalizing 
tendencies). See Figure 1 for a diagram of this comprehensive model.  
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One advantage of this path modelling technique is that it allows us to simultaneously 
predict multiple outcome variables within a single model.  We can therefore compare the 
cognitive predictors of belief in the existence of karma/god, beliefs about karma/god’s agency, 
and beliefs about karma/god’s non-agentic traits, all the while accounting for covariance between 
beliefs and these various traits.  Through this, we can test the hypothesis that cognitive biases are 
specifically associated with agentic views of God (e.g., belief in a benevolent god, not a distant, 
impersonal god), and test whether cognitive biases are also especially predictive of agentic views 
of karma or whether they broadly predict a variety of conceptualization of karma (e.g., as a 
morally-relevant causal force).  Path models also allow for hypothesis tests of null relationships 
between variables, by assessing whether the model fits the data reasonably well when omitting 
direct relationships between certain variables.  For example, in Study 2 we omit paths from 
dualism and teleology in life to non-agentic trait descriptions, to provide a more stringent test of 
the hypothesis that mentalistic cognitive biases will predict agentic, but not non-agentic views of 
supernatural entities. 
A further advantage of path models is that they can test for indirect, as well as direct, 
associations between variables, therefore documenting pathways that would be obscured in an 
ordinary multiple regression.  Specifically, we test a previously-demonstrated indirect pathway 
between mentalizing and belief to see if the small relationship between these variables can be 
accounted for by their shared relationship with the tendency toward dualistic and teleological 
thinking (a model shown to predict belief in God and in the paranormal in Willard, Cingl, et al., 
2020; Willard & Norenzayan, 2013).  We aim to replicate this model when predicting belief in 
God, and test whether the same model can predict belief in karma. We further expand on this 
previously-supported model by adding intuitive thinking as an additional indirect predictor of 
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belief, and showing that these cognitive variables predict the traits ascribed to karma and God 
above and beyond their influence on belief in general.  Finally, we test whether these indirect 
associations between intuitive thinking and belief, and mentalizing and belief, differs when 
predicting karma vs. God, and whether the predictors of karma remain when controlling for God 
beliefs,  to demonstrate whether unique intuitions underly belief in karma. 
Due to the important hypothesized role of cultural leaning in shaping both belief in God 
and karma (Gervais, Willard, Norenzayan, & Henrich, 2011; Lanman & Buhrmester, 2016; Maij 
et al., 2017; White, Norenzayan, et al., 2019), we investigated the predictors of beliefs in samples 
of participants from India and Singapore (one predominantly Hindu and one predominantly 
Buddhist country where social exposure to karma is common) and from Canada and the USA 
(where social exposure to karma is less common).  In Study 2, we also collected self-reports of 
participants’ social exposure to God and karma, which allowed us to directly investigate how 
learning about supernatural entities from family members predicts one’s own beliefs.  This 
allows us to test for an independent role of both cultural learning of belief—which would 
manifest in between-country differences in average karma belief, and within-country correlations 
between social exposure and belief commitments—and cognitive predictors of belief—which 
would manifest as additional unique predictors of belief within each country. 
  
2 Study 1 
2.1 Methods 
These data were part of a larger project examining belief in karma, including the 
psychometric properties and cultural and demographic correlates of the belief in karma 
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questionnaire.1  Participant recruitment plans and materials were preregistered on the Open 
Science Framework (https://osf.io/tg8ce/), but analyses reported here were not preregistered.  We 
reported how we determined sample sizes, disclose all data exclusions, manipulations, and 




Canadian and Indian participants were recruited to complete an online survey, through 
Research Now’s participant panels.2  We aimed to recruit a sample of 1000 participants in each 
country, as this sample size has 90% power to detect relatively small relationships between 
variables of interest (i.e., r ≥ .10).  Following preregistered criteria, we included loose quotas for 
age and gender (and region, in Canada), to generate a sample that broadly resembled the larger 
Canadian/Indian populations, and we excluded and replaced any participants (221 Canadians and 
616 Indians) who failed two attention check questions placed within the survey (e.g., “Please 
select ‘Disagree’ as your answer”) or who failed one attention check question and had a 
completion time less than half the median completion time of participants who passed both 
attention checks.  The final sample of 1000 Canadian participants and 1006 Indian participants 
(Table 1) were substantially different in their religious and cultural background: Canadian 
                                                 
 
1 Results from this portion of the dataset are available in (White, Norenzayan, et al., 2019).  
Additional analyses regarding the zero-order association between intuitive thinking tendencies and belief 
in God and karma are reported in (Baimel, White, & Norenzayan, 2019).   
2 Canadians chose to complete the survey in either English (83%) or French (17%). The French 
translation was generated by one bilingual research assistant (except for the mentalizing questionnaire, 
which was taken from the French translation by Gilet, Studer, Mella, Grühn, & Labouvie-Vief, 2013), 
then checked by a second, independent bilingual research assistant, and minor changes were made to 
ensure consistency.   Indian participants were fluent in English and completed the English questionnaire. 
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participants were primarily Caucasian and Christian or non-religious, whereas Indian participants 
were primarily Hindu, and substantially higher in religiosity, belief in God, and belief in karma 
than were Canadians, although the multi-item belief in karma questionnaire used here had similar 
psychometric properties in both countries (White, Norenzayan, et al., 2019).    
Table 1. Demographic composition of each sample. 
 Study 1 Study 2 
 
Canada India USA Singapore 
N 1000 1006 1244 508 
Gender     
Female 51 % 51 % 61% 59% 
Male 49 % 49 % 39% 41% 
Age M (SD) 46.69 (15.24) 38.62 (13.54) 45.79 (12.94) 37.47 (11.98) 
Ethnicity 
   Caucasian 
   Asian 


















   
Religion     
Christian 58 % 7% 65% -- 
Non-religious 31 % 1 % 24% -- 
Hindu 1 % 78 % 1% -- 
Buddhist  3% 0.2% 1% 100% 
Other 7 % 13.8 % 9% -- 
Religiosity  
M (SD) 2.44 (1.31) 3.84 (1.09) 2.69 (1.31) 2.75 (0.85) 
Spirituality 
M (SD) 3.11 (1.29) 3.91 (1.05) 3.14 (1.25) 2.59 (0.93) 
Belief in 
Karma M (SD) 2.71 (0.62) 3.69 (0.72) 2.87 (0.80) 3.73 (0.95) 
Belief in God 
M (SD) 4.48 (2.27) 6.10 (1.51) 3.87 (1.17) 3.43 (0.73) 
 
Note. Belief in God was measured on a 7-point scale in Study 1 and a 5-point scale in Study 2.  
Belief in karma, religiosity, and spirituality were measured on a 5-point scale in all studies. 
 
2.1.2 Materials 
Mentalizing. Individual differences in mentalizing—the willingness to think about and 
engage with other people’s mental states—were assessed through including seven items 
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regarding a willingness to feel empathic concern for others (e.g., “I am often quite touched by 
things I see happen”) and seven items regarding a willingness to take the perspective of others 
(e.g., “I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
perspective”), 5-point likert scale (Canada: α = .80; India: α = .65), drawn from the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983).  This scale was designed as a measure of an individuals’ self-
reported cognitive and emotional empathic engagement with other people, and provides an index 
of an individual’s tendency to think about the mental states of others.  This scale does not 
measure whether one is actually accurate in determining other people’s mental states, nor a more 
basic capacity to attribute any sort of agency or mental qualities to other people; rather, this 
measure captures variance within a general population in the willingness to consider the minds of 
others.  This scale therefore captures observable variance in mentalizing tendencies in general 
samples (i.e., where everyone is likely to possess some capacity for general mental state 
attribution), which would be obscured by merely asking about the presence/absence of mind 
attribution capabilities. 
Intuitive thinking style.  A preference for intuitive thinking was assessed through 10 
items from the experiential scale of the Rational-Experiential Inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 
1999), e.g., “I like to rely on my intuitive impressions” (5-point scale ranging from completely 
false to completely true; Canada: α = .87; India: α =  .69). 
Mind-body dualism.  Six items assessing mind-body dualism were taken from Riekki et 
al. (2013).  Participants indicated their agreement with statements that described the mind as 
different, and separate, from the body, e.g., “Minds are in principle independent of bodies, to 
which they are only temporarily attached” (5-point likert scale; Canada: α = .78, India: α = .70).  
Four additional items regarding monism (the belief that the mind and body are the same thing) 
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were removed from the analyses due to low reliability in a combined monism/dualism measure 
in the Indian sample (see Supplementary Materials for further details).  
Teleology in nature.  Participants reported whether 12 statements, which described a 
purpose behind the existence of natural phenomena, were literally true, e.g., “The sun makes 
light so that plants can photosynthesize” and “Earthquakes happen because tectonic plates must 
realign” (Canada: α = .86; India: α = .81, taken from Kelemen & Rosset, 2009).  Higher scores 
indicate a willingness to explicitly endorse natural phenomena as existing for a purpose. 
Teleology in life events.  Three items (adapted from Banerjee & Bloom, 2014) measured 
participants’ perception of purpose in life events: life events “happen for a reason,” “are 
predestined,” and include “signs and messages” (5-point likert scale; Canada: α = .75; India: α =  
.72).   
Features of God and Karma.  Participants reported whether several features were 
characteristic of God and characteristic of karma.  Thirteen items described the target’s agentic, 
mental capabilities, including cognitive abilities (e.g., “can think”), perceptual abilities (e.g., 
“can see”), morally-relevant abilities (e.g., “can tell right from wrong”), and morally-irrelevant 
abilities (e.g., “knows the volume of the Atlantic Ocean”).  The mean score across these thirteen 
items measured the degree of mind attributed to God and karma.  We also assessed whether God 
and karma were seen to have personalities, including punitive traits (“punishing,” “vengeful,” 
“terrifying,” “fearsome,” “angry,” “judging,” “controlling”) and benevolent traits (“loving,” 
“forgiving,” “compassionate,” “peaceful,” “comforting”).  (Composite α’s ranged from .86 to 
.98, across targets and countries.)  To assess non-anthropomorphic descriptions of Karma, 
participants also reported whether God and karma were “impersonal,” and whether God and 
karma “can be gained and lost.”   
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In addition to describing the features of each target, participants reported the perceived 
relationships between God and karma through two items, including whether God is “responsible 
for enacting karma” (5-point scale, from Karma operates independently of God to Karma occurs 
because of God’s will), and whether God can “intervene to over-rule karmic consequences” (5-
point scale, from God never contradicts Karma to God often intervenes and over-rules Karma).     
 Belief in God.  Participants reported their belief in the existence of God through a single 
item ranging from 1 = definitely does not exist to 7 = definitely does exist.   
Belief in Karma.  Participants completed a 16-item measure of belief in karma (White, 
Norenzayan, et al., 2019), which both refers to karma explicitly, e.g., “Karma is a force that 
influences the events that happen in my life,” and assesses belief in karmic causal processes 
within one lifetime and across reincarnations, e.g., “If a person does something bad, even if there 
are no immediate consequences, they will be punished for it in some future time in their life,” 
“After people die, they are reborn in a new body” (Canada: α = .93; India: α = .90).   
Demographics.   Participants reported several general demographic variables, including 
their age, gender, education, income, ethnicity, and political orientation.  Participants also 
reported their religious affiliation, frequency of religious attendance, level of religiosity and 
spirituality. 
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Path model predicting beliefs about karma and God 
Replicating previous findings, in both countries belief in God was modestly but 
positively correlated with intuitive thinking (Canada r = .07 95% CI [.004, .13], India r = .14 
[.08, .20]) and with mentalizing (Canada r = .19 [.12, .24], India r = .13 [.07, .19]).  Belief in 
karma was also positively correlated with intuitive thinking, with an even larger effect size 
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(Canada r = .27 [.21, .33], India r = .27 [.22, .33]), and with mentalizing (Canada r = .08 
[.02, .14], India r = .19 [.13, .25]).     
To further investigate how these individual differences predict beliefs about supernatural 
forces, we created a path model using the lavaan package for structural equation modeling in R 
(Rosseel, 2012).  Small amounts of missing data (0.3%) were accounted for using full 
information maximum likelihood (‘fiml’).  This path model allows us to simultaneously test the 
predictors of multiple dimensions of belief, and test the association between these beliefs, while 
also testing for hypothesized indirect relationships and hypothesized null relationships by 
omitting certain paths.  Analyses were conducted separately predicting beliefs about karma and 
beliefs about God, and separately for the Canadian and Indian samples. In this study, the same 
model (depicted in Figure 1) was applied to each of these four conditions (karma and God, in 
Canada and India), meaning that model fit statistics presented below indicate whether the same 
pattern of relationships fit the data well in each of these four models.  The relative size of these 
relationships is indicated by the path coefficient estimates and their confidence intervals, 
depicted in Table 2.  (Bivariate correlations between all variables are available in the 
Supplementary Materials.) 
Drawing on theorizing in the cognitive science of religion, we tested a model (depicted in 
Figure 1) in which beliefs about karma or God were predicted by individual differences in mind-
body dualism, teleological perceptions of life events, and teleological thinking about nature, 
which were in turn predicted by intuitive thinking and mentalizing tendencies.3  We omitted 
                                                 
 
3 Variables were entered into the path model as composite scores, created by averaging the items 
in each scale.  A similar pattern of path coefficients is found if we instead model these variables as latent 
variables (from their individual scale items), albeit with somewhat worse fit according to certain 
indicators (e.g., CFI) due to the increased complexity of the model.    
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direct paths between mentalizing and belief, to test whether this bivariate relationship was due to 
mentalizing’s relationship with dualism and teleology (consistent with Willard et al., 2020; 
Willard & Norenzayan, 2013).  We likewise omitted direct paths between intuitive thinking and 
belief.  In each model (predicting either karma or God), we simultaneously predicted both belief 
in karma/God and endorsement of various traits of karma/God, to assess how well these 
cognitive variables predict different conceptualization of karma/God.  Belief in karma/God was 
added as an additional predictor for each trait to assess if these cognitive biases predict 
endorsement of traits beyond endorsement of belief.  Residual correlations were added between 
each trait to account for any additional relationship they had with each other not accounted for by 
the cognitive biases and belief.   
Figure 1.  Study 1: Path model predicting supernatural beliefs, in Canada and India.   
 
 
In Canada, this model had a reasonably good fit to the data when predicting beliefs about 
karma, χ2 (12) = 33.94, p < .001, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .043 [.026, .060], SRMR = .023, and 
beliefs about God, χ2 (12) = 58.51, p < .001, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .062 [.047, .079], SRMR 
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= .029.  This model was also a reasonably good fit in India, when predicting beliefs about karma, 
χ2 (12) = 72.20, p < .001, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .071 [.055, .087], SRMR = .031, and beliefs 
about God, χ2 (12) = 78.01, p < .001, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .074 [.059, .090], SRMR = .032.  
Results of path coefficients for this model are displayed in Table 2.     
The overall pattern of path coefficients was largely similar in Canada and India.  This was 
confirmed by additional analyses, which demonstrated that a multigroup path model fit the data 
reasonably well when path coefficients were constrained to be equal across both countries, karma 
model: χ2 (53) = 166.34, p < .001, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .046 [.038, .054], SRMR = .034; God 
model: χ2 (53) = 342.66, p < .001, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .074 [.066, .081], SRMR = .064, 
indicating approximately equivalent associations between variables in both countries.  However, 
these similar paths exist alongside persistent mean differences in beliefs between the two 
countries (e.g., higher karma belief in India), as is indicated by the poor fit of a multigroup path 
model in which both the path coefficients and the intercepts were constrained to be equivalent 
across countries, karma model: χ2 (64) = 1079.72, p < .001, CFI = .82, RMSEA = .126 
[.119, .132], SRMR = .198; God model: χ2 (12) = 1255.41, p < .001, CFI = .79, RMSEA = .136 
[.130, .143], SRMR = .169.  In other words, these results indicate that cognitive biases do not 
override or account for cultural differences in karmic beliefs, but rather we found that the 
cognitive variables showed similar associations with belief within both countries despite 
between-country differences in mean belief levels.  
For the sake of comparison, alternative models that reversed the direction of the 
association between beliefs and cognitive biases (i.e., mentalizing and intuitive thinking predict 
beliefs, which predict dualism and teleological thinking) provided a worse fit to the data in every 
case, karma in Canada: χ2 (6) = 105.05, p < .001, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .13 [.11, .15], SRMR 
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= .037, God in Canada: χ2 (6) = 149.20, p < .001, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .15 [.13, .18], SRMR 
= .049, karma in India: χ2 (6) = 103.08, p < .001, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .13 [.11, .15], SRMR 
= .038, God in India, χ2 (6) = 115.29, p < .001, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .14 [.11, .16], SRMR 
= .041. 
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Table 2.  Study 1: Standardized path model estimates predicting beliefs about karma and God. 
 Karma God 
 Canada India Canada India 
 b 95% CI b 95% CI b 95% CI b 95% CI 
Dualism         
Intuition 0.26*** [0.20, 0.31] 0.14*** [0.08, 0.2] 0.26*** [0.20, 0.31] 0.14*** [0.08, 0.2] 
Mentalizing 0.11*** [0.05, 0.17] 0.14*** [0.08, 0.2] 0.11*** [0.05, 0.17] 0.14*** [0.08, 0.2] 
Teleology in Life Events        
Intuition 0.24*** [0.18, 0.3] 0.27*** [0.21, 0.33] 0.24*** [0.18, 0.3] 0.27*** [0.21, 0.33] 
Mentalizing 0.16*** [0.10, 0.22] 0.17*** [0.11, 0.23] 0.16*** [0.10, 0.22] 0.17*** [0.11, 0.23] 
Teleology in Nature        
Intuition 0.11*** [0.05, 0.17] 0.20*** [0.14, 0.26] 0.11*** [0.05, 0.17] 0.20*** [0.14, 0.26] 
Mentalizing 0.12*** [0.06, 0.18] 0.14*** [0.08, 0.2] 0.12*** [0.06, 0.18] 0.14*** [0.08, 0.20] 
Belief in Karma/God        
Dualism 0.29*** [0.23, 0.34] 0.18*** [0.12, 0.23] 0.04 [-0.02, 0.1] 0.01 [-0.06, 0.07] 
Teleology in life 0.45*** [0.40, 0.50] 0.45*** [0.40, 0.5] 0.45*** [0.40, 0.51] 0.41*** [0.36, 0.47] 
Teleology in nature 0.01 [-0.04, 0.06] 0.06* [0.01, 0.12] 0.03 [-0.02, 0.09] 0.04 [-0.02, 0.1] 
Mind         
Dualism 0.07* [0.01, 0.12] 0.16*** [0.10, 0.22] 0.00 [-0.04, 0.04] 0.06* [0.01, 0.11] 
Teleology in life 0.08** [0.02, 0.14] 0.09** [0.02, 0.15] 0.12*** [0.08, 0.17] 0.24*** [0.19, 0.29] 
Teleology in nature 0.02 [-0.03, 0.07] 0.12*** [0.06, 0.18] 0.00 [-0.04, 0.04] 0.03 [-0.02, 0.08] 
Belief 0.53*** [0.48, 0.59] 0.28*** [0.22, 0.35] 0.74*** [0.70, 0.77] 0.50*** [0.45, 0.55] 
Benevolence        
Dualism 0.06 [0.00, 0.12] 0.07* [0.00, 0.13] 0.04 [0.00, 0.09] 0.08** [0.02, 0.14] 
Teleology in life 0.07* [0.00, 0.14] 0.10** [0.03, 0.16] 0.11*** [0.06, 0.16] 0.25*** [0.19, 0.3] 
Teleology in nature 0.04 [-0.02, 0.09] 0.09** [0.03, 0.15] 0.02 [-0.02, 0.06] 0.09** [0.03, 0.14] 
Belief 0.38*** [0.31, 0.44] 0.30*** [0.23, 0.36] 0.68*** [0.64, 0.72] 0.34*** [0.29, 0.4] 
Punitiveness        
Dualism -0.05 [-0.11, 0.02] 0.06 [0.00, 0.13] -0.01 [-0.08, 0.06] 0.06 [-0.01, 0.12] 
Teleology in life 0.13*** [0.06, 0.20] 0.06 [-0.01, 0.13] 0.08* [0.00, 0.15] 0.09** [0.02, 0.16] 
Teleology in nature -0.01 [-0.07, 0.05] 0.03 [-0.03, 0.09] 0.01 [-0.05, 0.07] 0.08* [0.01, 0.14] 
Belief 0.29*** [0.22, 0.36] 0.21*** [0.14, 0.28] 0.05 [-0.02, 0.12] 0.08* [0.01, 0.15] 
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Impersonal        
Dualism 0.02 [-0.05, 0.08] 0.09** [0.03, 0.16] 0.07* [0.00, 0.14] 0.11** [0.04, 0.18] 
Teleology in life 0.06 [-0.01, 0.13] 0.02 [-0.05, 0.10] 0.06 [-0.01, 0.13] 0.07 [0.00, 0.14] 
Teleology in nature -0.04 [-0.10, 0.03] 0.03 [-0.03, 0.10] -0.04 [-0.10, 0.02] 0.08* [0.01, 0.14] 
Belief 0.24*** [0.17, 0.32] 0.16*** [0.09, 0.24] -0.10** [-0.17, -0.03] 0.06 [-0.01, 0.13] 
Resource         
Dualism 0.05 [-0.01, 0.11] 0.08* [0.01, 0.14] 0.06 [-0.01, 0.12] -0.01 [-0.07, 0.06] 
Teleology in life 0.09** [0.02, 0.15] 0.12*** [0.05, 0.19] 0.10** [0.03, 0.17] 0.07 [0.00, 0.14] 
Teleology in nature 0.02 [-0.04, 0.07] 0.09** [0.02, 0.15] 0.01 [-0.05, 0.06] 0.10** [0.04, 0.17] 
Belief 0.39*** [0.32, 0.46] 0.22*** [0.15, 0.29] 0.32*** [0.26, 0.38] 0.15*** [0.08, 0.22] 
 
Note.  *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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2.2.2 Do intuitive cognitive tendencies predict belief in God and karma? 
In this model, participants’ self-reported willingness to engage in mentalizing and 
intuitive thinking uniquely predicted greater mind-body dualism, teleological thinking about life 
events, and teleological thinking about nature, which in turn predicted supernatural beliefs.  In 
Canada and India, respectively, this model explained 23% and 18% of the variance in God4 
belief and 38% and 31% of the variance in karma belief.  In India, this model predicted 18% of 
the variance of belief in God and 31% of the variance in belief in karma.  Belief in God and 
karma was strongly predicted by teleological thinking about life events, while teleological 
thinking about nature was a much weaker predictor, and dualism only predicted belief in karma, 
not belief in God.  This failed to replicate the previously-found association between belief in God 
and mind-body dualism (which was found using a different measure of dualism, Willard et al., 
2020; Willard & Norenzayan, 2013), but it did replicate the finding that intuitive thinking, self-
reported mentalizing, and teleological thinking  predict belief in God, and also predict belief in 
karma. 
This model also supports an indirect association between self-reported willingness to 
mentalize and beliefs about supernatural entities (as found by Willard et al., 2020; Willard & 
Norenzayan, 2013), and also provides the novel finding that the relationship between intuitive 
thinking tendencies and supernatural beliefs can be partly explained by shared covariance with 
dualism and teleological thinking, especially in the case of belief in God.  Evidence for this 
                                                 
 
4 While we did not have any hypotheses about differences in the variance explained in God belief 
and karma belief, we note that the less variance explained in belief in God, compared to belief in karma, 
cannot merely be explained by unreliability of the single item used to measure belief in God.  In Study 2 
we find that a reliable 3-item measure of belief in God has similar levels of variance explained by 
cognitive variables in the USA (24%) and Singapore (11%). 
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comes from both the hypothesized model, which fits the data reasonably well while omitting 
direct paths between intuition/mentalizing and belief (i.e., specifying that there is no direct 
association between these variables) and from the residual errors, which depict the remaining 
associations between variables that are not accounted for by the hypothesized model.  After 
accounting for the indirect relationships between intuition and beliefs (depicted in Figure 1), the 
residual association between intuitive thinking and God belief was essentially absent in India (r 
< .001) and negative in Canada (r = -.076), indicating that, outside of the modeled indirect 
relationships, intuitive thinking was not positively associated with God belief, even in the 
residual errors.  In the case of karma, there remained a small positive residual association 
between intuitive thinking and belief in Canada (r = .065) and India (r = .089), consistent with 
the possibility that that belief in karma may reflect aspects of intuitive thinking that are separate 
from cognitive biases in mentalizing accounted for in the model (see supplemental for additional 
details of model residuals table).   
In addition to the path models that separately investigated predictors of God beliefs and 
predictors of karma beliefs, we conducted additional multiple regression analyses to investigate 
possible covariation between belief in God and belief in karma. In Canada, belief in God 
predicted greater belief in karma, b = 0.24, 95% CI [0.19, 0.29], p < .001.  However, belief in 
God was no longer a meaningful predictor when controlling for dualism, teleological thinking 
about nature and life events, intuitive thinking, and mentalizing (see Table 3).  Similarly in India, 
the association between belief in God and karma, b = 0.30 [0.26, 0.34], p < .001, was cut in half 
when controlling for these cognitive biases – a remaining positive association that may be due to 
the shared cultural sources of both beliefs in India, but not in Canada.  A second implication of 
these regression models is that they confirm that the cognitive variables uniquely predict belief in 
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karma even after controlling for belief in God, which justifies our presentation of separate 
models predicting karma beliefs and God beliefs.  In other words, it is not the case that these 
cognitive variables solely predict belief in God, and God beliefs predict karma beliefs; rather, 
these cognitive variables independently predict beliefs about karma (see Supplemental Materials 
for addition regressions that control for God beliefs when predicting karma’s mind, benevolence, 
punitiveness, and non-agentic qualities). 
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Table 3.  Study 1: Multiple regression predicting belief in karma from belief in God and cognitive variables 
 
  Canada India 
 β [95% CI] p β [95% CI] p β [95% CI] p β [95% CI] p 
Intercept 2.71 [2.66, 2.76] <.001 2.72 [2.68, 2.76] <.001 3.69 [3.65, 3.73] <.001 3.69 [3.65, 3.73] <.001 
Belief in 
God 
0.24 [0.19, 0.29] <.001 0.04 [-0.01, 0.08] .11 0.30 [0.26, 0.34] <.001 0.17 [0.13, 0.21] <.001 
Intuition    0.07 [0.03, 0.12] .001    0.08 [0.04, 0.12] <.001 
Mentalizing    -0.07 [-0.11, -0.02] .002    0.02 [-0.02, 0.06] .28 
Dualism    0.22 [0.18, 0.27] <.001    0.13 [0.09, 0.17] <.001 
Teleology in 
Life 
   0.35 [0.30, 0.40] <.001    0.23 [0.19, 0.28] <.001 
Teleology in 
Nature 
   0.01 [-0.03, 0.05] .59    0.02 [-0.02, 0.06] .29 
R2adj 0.09 0.39 0.17 0.36 
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2.2.3 Are cognitive biases especially associated with agentic views of supernatural forces? 
In addition to testing the predictors of beliefs in the existence karma and God, we also 
investigated how the cognitive variables predicted different conceptualizations of karma and God 
(i.e., whether karma/God has mental states, personality traits, or is impersonal), and how these 
beliefs were related to each other.  This allowed us, first, to test whether karma is conceived of as 
an impersonal, non-agentic force, unlike the typically-agentic and personified views of God, and 
second, to test whether self-reported mentalizing tendencies and related cognitive biases are 
especially relevant to belief in agentic, but not non-agentic supernatural entities.  Preliminary 
evidence in support of these hypotheses comes from believers’ differential attribution of traits to 
karma and God (Figures 2 and 3).  Further evidence comes from the pathways between general 
karma/God belief and trait attribution, included in the path models.  
Participants displayed a clear tendency to attribute a mind to God, and to view God as 
highly benevolent and generally non-punitive, whereas descriptions of God as “impersonal” or as 
something that can be “gained and lost” showed much less agreement and less consensus (Figure 
2).  This was especially true of Indian respondents, perhaps due to differences in which particular 
deity they had in mind when answering these items.  Direct paths between belief and trait ratings 
indicated that participants higher in belief in God were especially likely to ascribe mental 
capabilities and benevolent traits to God, especially in Canada, whereas punitive, impersonal, or 
resource-like descriptions were less associated with belief.  The path model indicates that 
individual differences in dualism, teleological thinking, and belief explain substantially more 
variance in viewing God as a benevolent agent (mind attribution: R2Canada = .64, R2India = .44; 
benevolence: R2Canada = .57,  R2India = .31), compared to the minimal variance explained for 
punitiveness (R2Canada = .012, R2India = .045), an impersonal God (R2Canada = .014, R2India = .046) 
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or a resource-like God (R2Canada = .16, R2India = .054). It also shows that teleological thinking and 
dualism predict additional variance in mind and benevolent trait ratings, even after controlling 
for general belief, consistent with the perspective that these cognitive tendencies specifically 
predict belief in an agentic God, not just any God belief.  This pattern is consistent with past 
research showing that mainstream contemporary believers in North America prototypically view 
God as a benevolent supernatural agent (e.g., Johnson, Okun, Cohen, Sharp, & Hook, 2018), and 
extends this findings to an Indian sample.  
Figure 2. Distribution of features attributed to God (believers only, n = 526 in Canada and n = 
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Figure 3. Distribution of features attributed to karma (believers only, n = 384 in Canada and n = 
834 in India). Vertical lines indicate the mean level of trait attribution in Canada (solid) and 
India (dashed).  
 
 
 Does this pattern extend to beliefs about karma?  The distributions of trait attributions to 
karma (by karma believers only, in Figure 3), indicated that descriptions of karma did not display 
the same benevolent agent prototype found for God: Ratings of karma’s mental capabilities and 
benevolence were much less skewed towards strong agreement, compared to descriptions of 
God, and punitive traits were attributed to karma more often than God, especially by Canadians.  
But neither was karma described as clearly non-agentic, there was no strong tendency for 
believers to disagree that karma has mental states and personality traits, no consensus that karma 
is impersonal or resource-like, nor any evidence of subsets of believers who accept and who 
reject karma’s agency.  Rather, across all measures, responses showed a lack of consensus and 
tended to fall closer to the scale midpoint, implying less certainty about what karma is or is not 
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like. Further, belief in karma predicted greater mind attribution to karma, benevolent and 
punitive trait ascriptions, and descriptions of karma as impersonal and resource-like (traits which 
were positively intercorrelated with one another, estimates range from r = 0.04 to 0.65), 
indicating no clear dissociation between agentic and non-agentic descriptions of karma (see 
Supplemental Materials for full details).  However, after controlling for belief in karma, 
teleological thinking and dualism tended to be a stronger predictor of mind attribution and 
benevolent trait ratings, than punitive, impersonal, or resource-like trait ratings of karma, 
consistent with the pattern found for beliefs about God.   Altogether, this model explained more 
variance in ratings of karma’s mental capabilities (R2Canada = .39, R2India = .23) than ratings that 
karma is impersonal (R2Canada = .083, R2India = .059) or resource-like (R2Canada = .23, R2India = .14), 
and more variance in ratings of karma’s benevolence (R2Canada = .21, R2India = .18) than 
punitiveness (R2Canada =.12, R2India = .085).   
These results therefore indicate that intuitive thinking, mentalizing, and related cognitive 
tendencies predict both belief in God and belief in karma, in similar ways, and that part of the 
reason for this may be that believers are sometimes willing to think about karma as a personified 
agent, akin to how believers personify God.5  However, believers were less certain about whether 
karma was agentic or impersonal, and there was less divergence between different trait 
attributions and belief in karma, supporting a difference between beliefs about God—a 
prototypical supernatural agent—and beliefs about karma.    
                                                 
 
5 However, exploratory analyses indicated that the degree of mind attribution to karma did not 
moderate the association between mentalizing and belief (interaction in Canada: β = 0.03, p = .17, India: β 
= 0.02, p = .30), providing evidence that the relationship between cognitive variables and belief is not 
solely driven by people who see karma as an agent.  The data are more consistent with the idea that 
believers were willing to see karma as both agentic and non-agentic, and cognitive variables predicted all 
of these beliefs about karma in similar ways. 
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2.3 Discussion 
The path models tested in Study 1 replicated prior evidence of associations between 
intuitive thinking, willingness to engage in mentalizing, and belief in God, and provided novel 
evidence that (a) the intuitive thinking relationship is indirectly associated with supernatural 
belief due to other cognitive biases, like teleological thinking, and (b) these associations are 
unique to belief in a benevolent, agentic god.  This pattern supports the theoretical claim that 
mentalizing tendencies are specifically predictive of belief due to the agentic features of God, 
such that people’s reported ease and willingness in considering other people’s mental states 
predicts their engagement in a personal relationship with an unseen deity using their socio-
cognitive reasoning capacities. 
These results also provide novel empirical evidence that willingness to mentalize and 
intuitive thinking independently predict belief in karma, in both Canada and India.  Importantly, 
this highlights how belief in karma cannot be reduced to intuitions about immanent justice that 
are distinct from the mentalizing capacities that predict belief in God.  Rather, karma is a 
multifaceted concept—that includes aspects of non-agentic causality, moralized reincarnation, 
and anthropomorphic personality traits—that are similarly predicted by the cognitive variables 
that predict belief in a prototypically agentic god. 
3 Study 2 
Study 2 tested the replicability and generalizability of the path model developed in Study 
1 in a conceptually-similar model in which mentalizing, intuitive thinking, dualism, and 
teleological thinking predicted beliefs about God and karma in a general sample of Americans 
and in a sample of Singaporean Buddhists.  The Buddhist sample allows us to test the 
generalizability of our results to another population where belief in karma is culturally 
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widespread.  Buddhism, like Hindu traditions, has a long history of endorsing karma as part of 
the structure of the universe (Bronkhorst, 2011), but typically contains beliefs about a variety of 
supernatural agents (e.g., Bodhisattvas) and ritual practices that differ from both the Hindu 
sample recruited in Study 1 and Christian-dominated samples from Canada and the USA.   
The variables included in this model were modified to include different measures of 
analytic thinking and self-reported mentalizing tendencies, which match other measures 
commonly used in past literature (the Cognitive Reflection Task and Empathy Quotient, e.g., 
used in Gervais et al., 2018; Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016; Willard et al., 2020; 
Willard & Norenzayan, 2013).  We also included more diverse measures of God and karma’s 
agentic and non-agentic traits, to provide a more reliable test of how these cognitive tendencies 
predict specific beliefs about the features of supernatural entities.  Finally, in addition to selecting 
participants from populations that were, a priori, expected to have different cultural exposure to 
karma, in Study 2 we directly measured participants’ self-reported social exposure to beliefs 
about God and karma.  Study 1 found that, although mean levels of karma belief are substantially 
higher in India than in Canada, cognitive variables predicted within-country variance in karma 
belief similarly in both contexts.  Study 2 therefore allowed us to compare the relative 
contribution of cultural and cognitive factors to predicting the variability of belief that exists 
within each country.   
 
3.1 Methods 
Participant recruitment plans, all materials, and planned analysis models were 
preregistered on the OSF prior to data collection (https://osf.io/sk6qt/).   
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3.1.1 Participants 
Participants completed the survey online and in English and were recruited by Qualtrics’ 
participant panels.  As in Study 1, we aimed to recruit a total sample of 1000 participants in the 
USA.  We aimed to recruit 500 participants in Singapore who were fluent in English.6  Karma 
beliefs are widespread in Singapore, but can be heterogeneous among adherents to different 
religious denominations (e.g., Christians vs. Taoists vs. Buddhists; Willard, Baimel, et al., 2020).  
We specifically recruited participants who selected Buddhist as their religious affiliation, to 
provide a sample where karma belief is both theologically and culturally normative.  Buddhists 
make up approximately 33% of the population of Singapore (Statistics Singapore, 2015), and 
provide a sample with a long cultural history of karma in religious doctrines, to compare to 
North American samples where exposure to karmic theology is less culturally common.  
Following preregistered criteria, we excluded and replaced participants who did not complete the 
survey (USA: n = 13, Singapore: n = 137), who failed an attention check question (USA: n = 
521, Singapore: n = 262), who provided a nonsensical response to an open-ended question 
(Singapore: n = 30), who speeded through the task (i.e., took less than half the median 
completion time, Singapore: n = 86), or who (in the Singapore sample) reported religious 
affiliation other than Buddhist.  As preregistered, we also included in our analyses extra 
participants in our sample (beyond the planned size) who completed the survey prior to data 
collection being terminated by Qualtrics panel managers.  The final sample of 1244 participants 
in the USA was demographically similar to the Canadian sample from Study 1 (see Table 1), 
                                                 
 
6 The Singapore Buddhist sample was the most expensive to recruit, therefore we aimed for a 
smaller sample size that still retained >80% power to detect relatively small relationships (r = .12) 
between variables of interest. English is an official language in Singapore and the language most people 
are educated in.  
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being predominantly Christian or non-religious and expressing stronger belief in God than belief 
in karma. The 508 participants in Singapore were primarily-Asian Buddhists, thus providing a 
sample with a long cultural history of karmic religious beliefs. 
3.1.2 Materials 
Data was collected as part of a larger survey.  This survey began with participants 
receiving instructions to think about karma or receiving neutral instructions while, in the USA, 
deciding how much money to share with a stranger in a dictator game, or in Singapore, deciding 
how much blame and hypothetical help victims of misfortune should receive.7  Participants then 
completed the belief in karma questionnaire (USA: α = .92, Singapore: α = .92, White, 
Norenzayan, et al., 2019), followed by several measures of individual differences and personal 
beliefs (presented in a randomized order), and provided demographic information.   
Mentalizing. Mentalizing tendencies were measured through a 22 item version of the 
Empathy Quotient (USA: α = .88, Singapore: α = .87, Wakabayashi et al., 2006). This scale 
measures an individual’s willingness to engage in mentalizing through the self-perceived ease 
and accuracy in thinking about other people’s mental states, e.g., “I find it easy to put myself in 
somebody else’s shoes,” “other people tell me I am good at understanding how they are feeling 
and what they are thinking.”  By using this measure, we are able to more closely replicate 
previously-documented associations between mentalizing and belief, which have used the 
Empathy Quotient questionnaire (e.g., Maij et al., 2017; Willard, Cingl, et al., 2020; Willard & 
Norenzayan, 2013).   
                                                 
 
7 Assignment to the karma prime vs. control condition had little association with the variables 
discussed here (rs < .10), therefore we ignore this variable in the following analyses.  Results from the 
dictator game are available in (White, Kelly, et al., 2019).   
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Analytic thinking ability. The ability to engage in analytic thinking was measured as the 
number of correct responses to the three-item Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT), in which the 
intuitive answer to the problem is incorrect and participants are required to override this intuition 
in order to come to the correct response (USA: α = .70, Singapore: α = .65,  Frederick, 2005). 
Mind-body dualism. Eight items were taken from Riekki et al.’s (2013) mind-body 
dualism scale (USA: α = .85, Singapore: α = .81).  Two additional reverse-scored items from this 
scale were also included, but removed from analyses due to low (negative) correlations with 
remaining scale items (r < -.20 after reverse scoring), which compromised scale reliability. 
Teleology in life events. Three items, used in Study 1, measured perceptions of purpose 
in life events (USA: α = .82, Singapore: α = .74). (Teleological thinking about nature was not 
collected in this dataset to reduce survey length, and because it was the weakest predictor of 
beliefs in Study 1.)  
Features of God and karma. Participants rated whether three different types of traits are 
characteristic of God and karma:  Non-moral agency of God and karma (“is loving,” “is 
forgiving,” “can think, “has free will,” “makes plans and works towards goals”), moral 
knowledge of God and karma (“rewards people for proper behavior,” “punishes people for bad 
behavior,” “can see what people are doing, even if they are far away in a foreign country,” “can 
see into people's hearts and know their thoughts and feelings”), and non-agentic traits of God 
(“abstract,” “impersonal,” “incomprehensible,” “distant,” “unknowable,” “limitless”) and non-
agentic traits of karma (“can be gained and lost,” “can exist in different amounts,” “is created by 
people’s actions,” “is balanced,” “is cyclical,” “is a positive force or energy”).  (Composite α’s 
ranged from .71, .92 across targets.)  Participants in Singapore were also asked which god they 
were describing when answering these questions: 25% specified that they were referring to a 
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Buddha or bodhisattva (primarily Guan Yin, the Goddess of Mercy), 9% referred to the Christian 
God or Jesus Christ, 2% specified another god unrelated to Buddhism and Christianity, and the 
remainder (64%) did not specify a particular god.  Trait ascription to these different types of 
gods did not significantly differ, so all responses were analyzed together. 
Belief in God. Three items measured belief in God (“I believe in God,” “I believe in a 
divine being who is involved in my life,” and “There is no God or higher power in the universe,” 
USA: α = .84, Singapore: α = .69).   
Social exposure to God/karma. Participants completed 4-item measures of social 
exposure to God and social exposure to karma: “I hear about karma [God] while attending 
religious services or meeting,” “I saw people engage in volunteer or charity work, because of 
karma [God],” “I saw people avoid harming others, because of karma [God]”, and “Most of my 
family believes in karma [God]” (USA: αKarma = .82, αGod = .77, Singapore: αKarma = .81, αGod = 
.77). 
3.2 Results  
3.2.1 Path model predicting beliefs about karma and God 
We replicated the positive correlation between mentalizing and belief in God in the USA 
r = .17, 95% CI [.12, .23], p < .001, but not in Singapore r = .04 [-.04, .13], p = .33. We also 
replicated the same association for karma, USA r = .25 [.19, .30], p < .001, Singapore r = .11 
[.02, .19], p = .015. The negative association between analytic thinking (CRT performance) and 
belief in God emerged in the USA r = -.12 [-.17, -.06], p < .001, but not in Singapore r = -.07 
[-.16, .02], p = .14. Similarly, the negative association between analytic thinking and karma was 
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found in the USA r = -.28 [-.33, -.22], p < .001, but not in Singapore r = -.11 [-.20, -.02], p 
= .16.8     
We next tested a preregistered path model (depicted in Figure 4) that mirrors the analytic 
strategy from Study 1, in which beliefs about karma or God were predicted by individual 
differences in mind-body dualism and teleological perceptions of life events, which were in turn 
were predicted by analytic thinking ability and mentalizing tendencies (omitting direct paths 
between mentalizing/analytical thinking and beliefs).  To assess how well these cognitive 
variables predicted different conceptualization of karma/God, we tested a model that 
simultaneously predicted belief in karma/God and descriptions of karma/God as possessing 
moral knowledge, non-moral agency, and non-agentic traits (with correlated residuals added 
between these beliefs). We also omitted paths from dualism and teleology in life to non-agentic 
trait descriptions, to provide a more stringent test of the hypothesis that mentalistic cognitive 
biases will predict agentic, but not non-agentic views of supernatural entities.  To this 
preregistered model, we also added an additional direct pathway between beliefs and trait 
ratings, to explore whether the cognitive variables predict trait ratings above and beyond their 
relationship with general belief in karma/God.  Small amounts of missing data (0.4%) were 
                                                 
 
8 This lack of a consistent association in Singapore may be due to the fact the Buddhism does not 
emphasize belief in a single entity clearly designated as “God”, but exploratory analyses that split the 
sample based on which god they chose to describe did not clearly resolve the issue.  The relationship 
between analytic thinking and belief in God was negative among participants (n = 44) who reported that 
they were describing the Christian God, r = -.35, but not among participants describing a buddha or 
bodhisattva (n = 129), r = .04, p = .63, or who did not specify a particular god (n = 326), r = -.05, p = .40.  
In contrast, mentalizing was not correlated with belief in God among participants describing the Christian 
God, r = .06, p = .72, or those not describing any particular god, r = -.02, p = .77, but did show a small 
positive correlation among participants describing a buddha or bodhisattva, r = .19, p = .03. The direct 
association between mentalizing or intuitive thinking and belief in God therefore appears to be 
inconsistent in Singapore, and future research with larger sample sizes is required to further probe these 
relationships.  
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accounted for using full information maximum likelihood (‘fiml’).  Further expanding on the 
model tested in Study 1, social exposure to belief in God/karma was also added as a predictor of 
all beliefs about God and karma, except for beliefs about karma’s non-moral agency, to test 
whether culturally-shared depictions of karma specifically support moralistic-but-non-agentic 
views of karma. 
Figure 4. Study 2: Path model predicting belief in karma.  Also not depicted are included 
correlated residuals between social exposure to karma and cognitive predictor variables. Dashed 
arrows indicate paths added to the karma model that were omitted from the model predicting 





3.2.1.1 Predicting beliefs about God.   
When predicting beliefs about God, the hypothesized model was not a good fit for the 
data when social exposure was treated as independent from the cognitive predictors (as 
preregistered), χ2 (14) = 324.56, p < .001, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .13 [.12, .15], SRMR = .11.   
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After correlated residuals were added between social exposure to God and other predictors of 
belief, this model provided a good fit to the data in the USA, χ2 (10) = 79.73, p < .001, CFI = .98, 
RMSEA = .075 [.060, .091], SRMR = .03.  This pattern thus suggests that social exposure to God 
not only predicts belief in specific supernatural entities, but may reflect a social environment that 
encourages a broad range of intuitions that support supernatural beliefs.   This revised model was 
applied to the Singapore sample, and was also a reasonably good fit for the data, Singapore, χ2 
(10) = 22.30, p = .001, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .049 [.021, .077], SRMR = .03. 
Multigroup path analyses indicated that the pattern of path coefficients was roughly 
equivalent across countries, as is indicated by acceptable model fit when the path coefficients are 
constrained to be equal across countries, χ2 (37) = 257.31, p < .001, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .082 
[.073, .092], SRMR = .067, but additional mean differences remained between cultures in 
endorsement of these beliefs, as indicated by poor model fit when both the path coefficients and 
the intercepts were constrained to be equivalent across countries, χ2 (46) = 918.89, p < .001, CFI 
= .84, RMSEA = .147 [.139, .156], SRMR = .112. 
Results of this model are displayed in Table 4 (results of an analogous preregistered 
model that did not include social exposure, and is therefore more comparable to the results of 
Study 1, are available in the Supplementary Materials).  This model, depicted in Figure 4, 
explained substantial variance in belief in God (R2USA = .37, R2Singapore = .20), God’s moral 
knowledge (R2USA = .36, R2Singapore = .15), and agentic views of God (R2USA = .39, R2Singapore 
= .15).  As in Study 1, dualism was not a meaningful predictor of belief in God, but teleological 
thinking about life events and social exposure to belief in God were both strong predictors, 
supporting an indirect association between mentalizing tendencies, intuitive thinking, and beliefs 
about God, even in a sample, like Singapore, where no direct, bivariate association appears 
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between mentalizing/intuitive thinking and belief.  In addition to these cognitive variables, social 
exposure to belief in God was a large independent predictor of belief in God, God’s moral 
knowledge, and God’s non-moral agency, but was more weakly related to non-agentic views of 
God. 
The omitted paths in this model also support the claim that these cognitive tendencies do 
not predict non-agentic (e.g., abstract, impersonal) views of God.  Participants tended to describe 
God as high in agency and moral knowledge, and rather low in non-agentic traits, especially in 
the USA (Figure 5), and direct paths between beliefs and traits indicated that participants high in 
belief in God were especially likely to describe God as agentic and possessing moral knowledge, 
whereas belief in God had a smaller association with non-agentic trait ratings in Singapore and a 
negative association with non-agentic trait ratings in the USA. 
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Table 4. Study 2: Standardized path model estimates predicting beliefs about karma and God. 
 Karma God 
 USA Singapore  USA Singapore 
 b 95% CI b 95% CI b 95% CI b 95% CI 
Dualism         
Analytic thinking -0.12*** [-0.17, -0.06] -0.04 [-0.13, 0.05] -0.12*** [-0.17, -0.06] -0.04 [-0.13, 0.05] 
Mentalizing 0.18*** [0.12, 0.23] 0.14*** [0.05, 0.22] 0.18*** [0.12, 0.23] 0.14** [0.05, 0.22] 
Teleology in Life Events       
Analytic thinking -0.15*** [-0.21, -0.1] -0.04 [-0.12, 0.05] -0.15*** [-0.21, -0.10] -0.04 [-0.13, 0.05] 
Mentalizing 0.30*** [0.25, 0.35] 0.25*** [0.17, 0.33] 0.30*** [0.25, 0.35] 0.25*** [0.17, 0.33] 
Belief         
Dualism 0.17*** [0.13, 0.22] 0.10* [0.02, 0.18] -0.02 [-0.07, 0.03] 0.06 [-0.02, 0.14] 
Teleology in life 0.29*** [0.24, 0.34] 0.32*** [0.24, 0.39] 0.34*** [0.29, 0.39] 0.27*** [0.19, 0.35] 
Social Exposure 0.35*** [0.31, 0.40] 0.24*** [0.16, 0.32] 0.39*** [0.34, 0.43] 0.28*** [0.20, 0.36] 
Analytic thinking -0.13*** [-0.17, -0.09] -0.11** [-0.19, -0.04]     
Agency         
Dualism 0.04 [-0.01, 0.09] 0.07 [-0.01, 0.16] -0.02 [-0.06, 0.02] 0.01 [-0.05, 0.08] 
Teleology in life 0.01 [-0.04, 0.07] 0.06 [-0.03, 0.16] 0.10*** [0.06, 0.14] 0.07* [0.00, 0.13] 
Social Exposure 0.28*** [0.22, 0.33] 0.09* [0.00, 0.18] 0.22*** [0.18, 0.26] 0.19*** [0.11, 0.27] 
Belief 0.35*** [0.30, 0.41] 0.19*** [0.10, 0.29] 0.59*** [0.55, 0.63] 0.39*** [0.31, 0.47] 
Analytic thinking   -0.16*** [-0.22, -0.1]     
Moral knowledge        
Dualism 0.02 [-0.03, 0.07] 0.05 [-0.03, 0.13] -0.02 [-0.06, 0.02] 0.06 [0.00, 0.13] 
Teleology in life 0.08** [0.03, 0.13] 0.19*** [0.11, 0.28] 0.16*** [0.11, 0.2] 0.07 [0.00, 0.14] 
Social Exposure 0.21*** [0.16, 0.26] 0.13** [0.05, 0.22] 0.20*** [0.16, 0.25] 0.19*** [0.11, 0.28] 
Belief 0.39*** [0.33, 0.45] 0.29*** [0.2, 0.37] 0.50*** [0.46, 0.55] 0.33*** [0.25, 0.41] 
Non-agentic traits        
Dualism 0.04 [-0.01, 0.09] 0.05 [-0.02, 0.13]     
Teleology in life 0.08** [0.03, 0.14] 0.21*** [0.13, 0.29]     
Social Exposure 0.18*** [0.13, 0.24] 0.14**** [0.06, 0.22] 0.11** [0.04, 0.17] 0.16*** [0.07, 0.25] 
Belief 0.41*** [0.35, 0.46] 0.34*** [0.26, 0.42] -0.08* [-0.14, -0.01] 0.21*** [0.12, 0.30] 
 
Note.  *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Figure 5. Distribution of features attributed to God, among God believers in the USA (light grey, 
n = 929) and Singapore (dark grey, n = 347).  Vertical lines indicate the mean level of trait 
attribution in the USA (solid) and Singapore (dashed). 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of features attributed to karma, among karma believers in the USA (light 
grey, n = 562) and Singapore (dark grey, n = 429).  Vertical lines indicate the mean level of trait 
attribution in the USA (solid) and Singapore (dashed). 
 
 
3.2.1.2 Predicting beliefs about karma.   
When predicting beliefs about karma, the original preregistered model did not provide a 
good fit to the data in the USA sample, χ2 (15) = 487.33, p < .001, CFI = .90, RMSEA = .16 
[.15, .17], SRMR = .13. Further exploratory work was done to investigate the reasons for this 
misfit, and based on that, adjustments were made to improve model fit (given the exploratory 
nature of these analyses, these results should be interpreted with caution). Three changes were 
made to improve model fit, based on an inspection of model residuals in the USA sample. First, 
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the direct paths between dualism, teleology, and social exposure and beliefs that had previously 
been omitted were replaced; contrary to hypotheses, dualism and teleological thinking about life 
events predicted both non-agentic and agentic views of karma in similar ways.  Second, as 
hypothesized model fit was improved by adding a direct path from intuitive thinking to belief in 
karma, consistent with the hypothesis that that belief in karma may reflect aspects of intuitive 
thinking that are separate from cognitive biases in mentalizing accounted for in the model.  
Third, correlated residuals were added between social exposure to karma and the other predictors 
of belief.  
This revised model was a reasonably good fit to the data in the USA, χ2 (7) = 55.39, p 
< .001, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .071 [.053, .090], SRMR = .022, and is depicted in Figure 4.  This 
revised model was applied to the Singapore sample, with one additional path—between analytic 
thinking and non-moral agency of karma—added to bring model fit within an acceptable range: 
χ2 (6) = 27.20, p < .001, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .083 [.053, .116], SRMR = .024. These models 
indicate that, in both samples, endorsement of mind-body dualism, teleological thinking about 
life events, and social exposure to karma were each unique predictors of beliefs about karma, 
while mentalizing was indirectly associated with belief via these other cognitive tendencies.   
Multigroup path analyses indicated that the pattern of path coefficients was roughly 
equivalent across countries, as is indicated by acceptable model fit when the path coefficients are 
constrained to be equal across countries, χ2 (33) =116.51, p < .001, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .054 
[.043, .065], SRMR = .047, but additional mean differences remained between cultures in 
endorsement of these beliefs, as indicated by poor model fit when both the path coefficients and 
the intercepts were constrained to be equivalent across countries, χ2 (42) = 868.02, p < .001, CFI 
= .86, RMSEA = .150 [.141, .159], SRMR = .170. 
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Additional multiple regression analyses indicated that these cognitive variables explain a 
substantial portion of the covariation between belief in God and belief in karma.  Belief in God 
predicted greater belief in karma in the USA, b = 0.17 [0.13, 0.21], p < .001, and Singapore, b = 
0.16 [0.11, 0.21], p < .001, but when controlling for dualism, teleological thinking about life 
events, intuitive thinking, and mentalizing, the relationship with belief in God was substantially 
reduced in Singapore and became negatively associated with belief in karma in the USA (Table 
5).  This indicates that the positive association between belief in God and karma can be explained 
by shared cognitive intuitions that predict both beliefs.  When controlling for this shared 
covariance, the remaining small negative relationship between God and karma may be due to 
religious/cultural contexts that encourage belief in God while inhibiting belief in karma, or vice 
versa (e.g., commitment to mainline Christian denominations vs. being spiritual-but-not-
religious, see White, Norenzayan, et al., 2019).  These multiple regressions again also confirm 
that the association between the cognitive variables and belief in karma exists independently of 
the covariation between these variables and belief in God. 
Unlike in Study 1, where the path model explained minimal variance in non-agentic 
viewed of karma/God (i.e., less than 5% of the variance in impersonal descriptions and less than 
14% of the variance resource-like descriptions), this model explained substantial variance in 
belief in karma (R2USA = .45, R2Singapore = .26), karma’s moral knowledge (R2USA = .26, R2Singapore 
= .19), agentic views of karma (R2USA = .27, R2Singapore = .09), and non-agentic views of karma 
(R2USA = .26, R2Singapore = .23).   
Karma was generally described as less agentic than God, but believers still endorsed 
agentic descriptions of karma at above floor levels (Figure 6).  Agentic descriptions of karma 
were higher when pertaining to moral knowledge (e.g., “karma rewards people for proper 
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behavior”), than non-moral features (e.g., “karma has free will”), suggesting that believers are 
especially willing to think about karma’s moral dimension using agentic language. But the 
positive associations between belief in karma (and social exposure to karma) and all trait 
ascriptions imply that both agentic and non-agentic views of karma tend to be compatible with 
belief.  Teleological thinking also explained additional variance in ratings of karma’s moral 
knowledge and non-agentic traits (although not non-moral agency), even after controlling for 
general belief and social exposure to karma, although dualism did not.  This pattern of 
simultaneous, independent predictors indicates that both cognition and culture play a role in 
encouraging a variety of karma beliefs, even those thought to be theologically-incorrect like 
viewing karma as a social agent. 
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Table 5.  Study 2: Multiple regression predicting belief in karma from belief in God and cognitive variables. 
 USA Singapore 
 β [95% CI] p β [95% CI] p β [95% CI] p β [95% CI] p 
Intercept 2.87 [2.83, 2.92] <.001 2.87 [2.83, 2.91] < .001 3.58 [3.53, 3.63] <.001 3.58 [3.54, 3.63] <.001 
Belief in God 0.17 [0.13, 0.21] <.001 -0.05 [-0.09, -0.01] .025 0.16 [0.11, 0.21] <.001 0.06 [0.01, 0.11] .020 
Analytic 
thinking 
   -0.14 [-0.17, -0.10] <.001    -0.06 [-0.11, -0.01] .017 
Mentalizing    0.05 [0.01, 0.09] .007    0.00 [-0.05, 0.05] .97 
Dualism    0.21 [0.17, 0.25] <.001    0.08 [0.03, 0.13] .001 
Teleology in 
Life 
   0.31 [0.26, 0.35] <.001    0.20 [0.15, 0.26] <.001 
R2adj  0.05  0.35  0.07  0.21 
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3.3 Discussion 
Study 2 provided a conceptual replication of the path models from Study 1 across two 
additional cultural contexts, the USA and Singapore.  These path models replicated several key 
findings from Study 1: Reported willingness to engage in mentalizing and intuitive thinking were 
specifically (indirectly) associated with belief in God as a personalized, morally-concerned 
agent, and unassociated with belief in god as an abstract, impersonal force.  In contrast, 
mentalizing and intuitive thinking were indirectly associated with a variety of conceptualizations 
of karma (as agentic, morally-concerned, and as a non-agentic causal principle) that were held 
concurrently by believers.  Thus, belief in karma cannot be solely explained as an intuition 
unrelated to mentalizing, nor is it identical to other supernatural beliefs.  These patterns also hold 
after controlling for self-perceived cultural exposure to karma beliefs and god beliefs.  This does 
not mean that cultural learning is unimportant. Social exposure to karma and God remains strong 
predictors of belief within each country. Rather, the data show that cognitive variables explain an 
additional piece of the puzzle when predicting supernatural beliefs. 
4 General Discussion 
Across two studies including Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, and non-religious participants 
from Canada, the United States, India, and Singapore, we provide novel evidence that intuitive 
cognitive tendencies predicted both belief in God—a prototypically agentic and moralizing 
supernatural agent—and belief in karma—an ambiguously-agentic but also a morally-relevant 
supernatural entity.  The tendency to trust one’s intuitions and the self-reported willingness 
engage with others’ mental states predicted endorsement of mind-body dualism and teleological 
perceptions of life events, which in turn predicted a variety of beliefs about God and karma.  Our 
results also indicate how believers mentally represent the concept of karma, and reveal that belief 
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in karma possesses a distinct cognitive profile that distinguishes it from both belief in god and 
intuitive cognitive heuristics related to fairness.   
Our findings reveal the limited explanatory power of the hypothesis that belief in karma 
is a unique cognitive intuition that is unrelated to mentalizing and perceptions of supernatural 
agency.  This is a plausible theoretical prediction based on theologically-correct depictions of 
karma as an impersonal law of nature.  Such a unique karmic intuition (which is perhaps indexed 
by perceptions of immanent justice that are well-documented around the world, e.g., Baumard & 
Boyer, 2013; Baumard & Chevallier, 2012; Callan et al., 2010) would also help to explain why 
karmic beliefs are so prevalent across world cultures.  Consistent with this perspective, we have 
found that karma beliefs are widespread in samples of Hindus and Buddhists, and also (at least at 
low levels) among Western samples who lack meaningful cultural reinforcement of karmic 
beliefs.  As evidence that these karma beliefs are intuitive, our data reveals that people who tend 
to trust their intuition or think less reflectively are more likely to believe in karma, across several 
cultural contexts.  In addition, a residual direct association between intuitive thinking tendencies 
and belief in karma remains after controlling for the other measured cognitive variables, 
suggesting that intuitions not indexed in the present studies also play a role in karma belief.  No 
such residual association remained between intuitive thinking and belief in God, indicating 
divergences between predictors of different types of beliefs.   
Therefore, the present research indicates that such an intuition—that deserving 
misfortune translates into actually causing that misfortune to occur—may be part of the 
explanation for karma beliefs.  However, the present research also documents several dimensions 
of karma beliefs that cannot be explained by intuitions about immanent justice.  Belief in karma 
cannot be solely explained by intuitions about impersonal causality that are distinct from the 
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predictors of God belief, given that mentalizing tendencies also predict belief in karma, including 
predicting the belief that karma possesses agentic traits similar to the traits of God.   
Why do mentalizing tendencies predict belief in god and belief in karma?  In the case of 
belief in God, our data supports the argument that because God is typically conceived as a 
morally concerned social agent, understanding minds is important also for belief in God’s mind, 
thus making belief in a personal God less plausible and compelling to individuals who are less 
prone to mentalizing.  Specifically, we measured mentalizing as the self-reported willingness to 
engage with other people’s mental states (e.g., a perceived ease of social interactions and 
empathy), which predicted cognitive biases that likewise reflect a willingness to consider mental 
states and intentions as something distinct from physical bodies (dualism) and as pervasive in life 
events and natural phenomena (teleologically thinking).  This means that our results are limited 
to variables that assess these cognitive tendencies through self-reported perceptions, not through 
measures of actual accuracy in reasoning about mental states, nor through the mere presence vs. 
absence of these capabilities (such measures of actual capabilities provide interesting directions 
for future research using alternative methods, e.g., recruiting individuals on the autism 
spectrum).  Our results specifically demonstrate that individuals who feel generally willing and 
able to think about other people’s mental states, also hold a dualistic view of the mind as separate 
and independent of bodies, and imbue life events and natural phenomena with intentionality, and 
that these self-reported cognitive tendencies predict supernatural beliefs.  
Consistent with this view, cognitive tendencies predicted agentic beliefs about God 
substantially better than non-agentic beliefs about God.  These cognitive variables likewise 
predict agentic beliefs about karma.  In addition, mind attribution to karma was positively 
associated with belief, consistent with the perspective that mind attribution provides an effective 
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and engaging way to understand unseen supernatural forces.  However, this theoretical argument 
also provides an incomplete explanation for our results, given that, in every sample, willingness 
to engage in mentalizing also predicted non-agentic beliefs about karma, and both agentic and 
non-agentic descriptions were associated with belief.  In other words, cognitive predictors of 
belief in karma are neither completely distinct from the predictors of God, nor identical to them.  
This more general association between mentalizing and karma belief can be better 
understood by broadening our theoretical explanation for how mentalizing is recruited for 
supernatural beliefs, to consider the many dimensions of karma belief that might be understood 
through mental state reasoning.  Belief in karma (as found in world religions and as indexed by 
the self-report measure used in these studies) (a) entails understanding human moral action and 
thinking about how moral behavior influences future outcomes, thereby engage mind perception 
processes that are intimately intertwined with much moral cognition (Gray et al., 2012); (b) 
involves the expectation of karmic repercussions even after death, and in future reincarnations, 
which reflects an expectation of mind-body dualism (C. White, 2017); and (c) implies that life 
events happen for a reason, thus relying on a teleological understanding of causal processes 
(Banerjee & Bloom, 2014).  This belief in karma—as moralized causality across 
reincarnations—does not require that karma be a supernatural agent, and many believers were 
willing to ascribe both agentic and non-agentic characteristics to karma, perhaps indicating 
flexibility in how believers think about (or at least, talk about) what karma is like.  
The distributions of participants’ responses also suggest uncertainty or a lack of fixed 
beliefs about karma’s attributes: Trait ratings did not show clear ceiling or floor effects, and 
many participants selected the scale mid-point for each question about karma.  This pattern of 
trait attributions, combined with the positive association between mentalizing and karma belief, 
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indicate either that believers think of karma as something agentic (like God) or that they are 
willing to apply mental state reasoning to make sense of karma in the face of uncertainty about 
what karma is truly like. This is consistent with previous evidence that mental state reasoning 
allows perceivers to make sense of otherwise ambiguous and unpredictable experiences (Epley et 
al., 2007; Kay et al., 2010; Laurin & Kay, 2017; Waytz et al., 2010).  Neither agentic nor non-
agentic views of karma are incompatible with belief, or incompatible with one another.  
Future research may reveal unique causes or varied consequences of different mental 
models of karma that were not detected in our studies.  There may be additional individual 
differences or cultural influences that could explain why some people hold more or less agentic 
conceptions of karma.  Theological teachings about God’s abstract, superhuman attributes, 
learned over the course of development, play some role in adult’s conception of God as distinct 
from human agents (Barlev et al., 2017, 2018, 2019; Richert et al., 2017; Saide & Richert, 2020); 
theological teachings conveyed through participation in religious communities may similarly 
play a role in beliefs about karma.  Views of karma may also vary across different contexts.  For 
example, the dyadic morality perspective (Gray & Wegner, 2010; Schein & Gray, 2018) might 
predict that karma would be perceived as especially agentic when karmic punishments/rewards 
cannot be explained through more mundane causal mechanisms, whereas retribution that follows 
immoral behavior through the intervention of human punishers or other secular forces might be 
conceived of as “karmic” in a more abstract way.  The lack of a fixed, certain mental 
representation of karma also lends itself to future experimental work, which can test the causal 
effect of thinking about a more agentic vs. less agentic supernatural being.  For example, the 
association between mentalizing and belief might be stronger among individuals led to think 
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about karma as a social agent, and weaker among those primed with karma as an impersonal 
causal force. 
In contrast to the predictors of karma, the cognitive and cultural variables studied here 
did not predict non-agentic conceptualizations of God.  This raises the question of which 
individual differences or social influences support non-anthropomorphic views of God, 
especially in populations (e.g., among Muslims) where agentic, personalized views of God are 
actively discouraged and low levels of God anthropomorphism is observed among adults and 
children (Richert et al., 2016, 2017).  Further research is needed using both more diverse 
measures of beliefs about God (e.g., Johnson et al., 2018), and sampling from more diverse 
cultural and religious groups, to broaden our understanding of how cognitive factors predict 
specific beliefs about supernatural entities and how this might interact with cultural influences. 
Our results provide one piece of this puzzle, across four different countries which vary in 
their religious histories of karma and god beliefs.  We find that a similar pattern of cognitive 
predictors of belief is found among both Canadian and Indian participants (Study 1), despite 
differences in the cultural-prevalence and religious histories of karma beliefs in these two 
nations. Cognitive variables also indirectly predicted how much Americans and Singaporeans 
believed in karma, above and beyond the variability explained by an individual’s social exposure 
to other people’s beliefs (Study 2).  That is, on average karmic beliefs are more prevalent in 
certain countries where the concept of karma is normative in cultural and religious discourse, and 
an individual’s level of social exposure predicts their level of karmic beliefs.  But cognitive 
variables predicted additional variation in individuals’ beliefs beyond these cultural factors, and 
the pattern of cognitive predictors was similar across cultural contexts.  This pattern supports the 
role of both cultural learning and cognitive biases in shaping supernatural beliefs. 
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Our studies partly replicate and extend past research regarding intuitive cognitive 
tendencies as predictors of supernatural beliefs, alongside robust cultural predictors of belief, but 
open questions remain about why these relationships exist and to what extent they are robust 
across different samples of participants and different types of beliefs.  We present correlational 
evidence of the interrelationships between various cognitive tendencies and belief in morally-
concerned theistic and non-theistic entities, but future experimental and longitudinal work is 
required to establish the causal pathways through which cognitive intuitions shape supernatural 
beliefs.  A willingness to engage with human minds does not always, automatically, or inevitably 
result in the perception of supernatural minds operating in the world, nor are agentic supernatural 
entities the only unseen causal forces that are intuitively compelling, but these cognitive factors 
can provide part of the explanation for the ubiquity and the variation in supernatural beliefs 
around the world. 
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Bivariate correlations between variables 
Table 1. Bivariate correlations between all variables, Canadian participants, Study 1 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Intuition                 
2. Mentalizing .21                
3. Dualism .28 .17               
4. Teleology in 
life  .28 .21 .36 
             
5. Teleology in 
nature .14 .15 .20 .12 
            
6. Belief in 
Karma .27 .08 .45 .55 .12 
           
7. Mind of 
Karma .21 .04 .35 .41 .11 .61 
          
8. Benevolence 
of karma .17 .08 .26 .31 .11 .45 .52 
         
9. Punitiveness 
of karma .08 -.04 .13 .27 .03 .34 .46 .43 
        
10. Impersonal 
karma .07 -.01 .14 .20 .01 .28 .35 .34 .58 
       
11. Resource-
like karma .20 .02 .26 .33 .09 .46 .74 .46 .32 .25 
      
12. Belief in 
God .07 .19 .22 .47 .10 .30 .26 .22 .17 .12 .17 
     
13. Mind of God .08 .14 .20 .47 .08 .29 .35 .24 .25 .14 .26 .80     
14. Benevolence 
of God .07 .21 .23 .45 .10 .30 .30 .33 .24 .15 .23 .75 .75 
   
15. Punitiveness 
of God -.03 -.11 .03 .10 .02 .15 .25 .23 .37 .26 .12 .09 .20 .15 
  
16. Impersonal 
God -.01 -.09 .06 .03 -.03 .13 .21 .23 .23 .28 .15 -.06 .01 .03 .54 
 
17. Resource-
like God .07 .07 .16 .27 .06 .27 .32 .24 .22 .16 .28 .38 .52 .38 .19 .16 
 
Note.  Any correlations > .06 are statistically significant at p < .05.  
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Table 2: Bivariate correlations between all variables, Indian participants, Study 1 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Intuition                 
2. Mentalizing .22                
3. Dualism .18 .18               
4. Teleology in 
life  .31 .23 .33 
             
5. Teleology in 
nature .23 .18 .33 .27 
            
6. Belief in 
Karma .27 .19 .35 .53 .24 
           
7. Mind of 
Karma .18 -.02 .33 .32 .27 .41 
          
8. Benevolence 
of karma .16 .05 .23 .30 .21 .39 .42 
         
9. Punitiveness 
of karma .05 -.08 .17 .20 .12 .27 .33 .39 
        
10. Impersonal 
karma .02 -.02 .17 .15 .11 .22 .30 .36 .52 
       
11. Resource-
like karma .16 -.01 .22 .28 .20 .33 .61 .32 .25 .19 
      
12. Belief in 
God .14 .13 .16 .43 .15 .42 .22 .24 .09 .07 .16 
     
13. Mind of God .19 .15 .23 .48 .19 .43 .37 .26 .18 .13 .26 .62     
14. Benevolence 
of God .24 .20 .24 .44 .23 .34 .17 .38 .18 .15 .13 .47 .49 
   
15. Punitiveness 
of God .03 -.13 .13 .17 .13 .18 .30 .28 .52 .30 .17 .14 .21 .19 
  
16. Impersonal 
God .01 -.08 .17 .15 .14 .16 .21 .23 .26 .40 .11 .12 .14 .17 .45 
 
17. Resource-
like God .11 -.01 .07 .16 .14 .12 .32 .17 .14 .11 .26 .19 .40 .13 .22 .11 
 
Note.  Any correlations > .06 are statistically significant at p < .05. 
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Table 3: Bivariate correlations between all variables, American participants, Study 2 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Analytic 
thinking            
  
2. Mentalizing -.12             
3. Dualism -.14 .19            
4. Teleology in 
life -.19 .32 .38           
5. Belief in karma -.28 .25 .43 .51          
6. Agency of 




-.13 .24 .29 .36 .55 .70        
8. Non-agentic 
karma -.15 .28 .31 .37 .57 .69 .83       
9. Belief in God -.12 .17 .19 .49 .21 .11 .12 .12      
10. Agency of 




-.14 .19 .21 .49 .29 .26 .33 .28 .68 .87    
12. Non-agentic 
God .01 -.05 .20 .05 .18 .22 .25 .28 -.02 .17 .20   
13. Karma Social 
Exposure -.19 .23 .36 .36 .54 .49 .46 .45 .15 .19 .23 .17  
14.  God Social 
Exposure -.08 .22 .20 .41 .16 .15 .17 .16 .52 .56 .52 .07 .31 
 
 
Note.  Any correlations > .06 are statistically significant at p < .05. 
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Table 4: Bivariate correlations between all variables, Singapore participants, Study 2 
 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Analytic 
thinking            
  
2. Mentalizing .10             
3. Dualism -.03 .13            
4. Teleology in 
life -.02 .25 .27           
5. Belief in karma -.11 .11 .26 .42          
6. Agency of 




-.03 .23 .21 .37 .43 .67        
8. Non-agentic 
karma .04 .22 .24 .41 .50 .64 .79       
9. Belief in God -.07 .04 .19 .37 .27 .23 .29 .26      
10. Agency of 




.02 .14 .24 .31 .31 .39 .52 .49 .44 .82    
12. Non-agentic 
God .01 .09 .20 .22 .15 .37 .40 .41 .27 .67 .62   
13. Karma Social 
Exposure .05 .14 .29 .31 .37 .20 .31 .35 .25 .25 .27 .15  
14.  God Social 
Exposure -.02 .15 .20 .28 .18 .17 .24 .24 .37 .35 .34 .24 .62 
 
Note.  Any correlations > .10 are statistically significant at p < .05. 
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Study 1: Dualism vs. Monism Measures 
As a measure of individual differences in mind-body dualism, this survey included 10 items 
(draw from Riekki, Lindeman, & Lipsanen, 2013) that assessed two separate possibilities for the 
mind-body relationship: dualism, the belief that the mind is independent and fundamentally 
different from the body, and monism, the belief that the mind and body/brain are the same and 
fundamentally united.  We had initially intended to combine these two into a single measure of 
mind-body dualism (after reverse-scoring the monism dimension), but, contrary to expectations, 
dualism and monism subscales were actually positively correlated with one another, and 
therefore could not be meaningfully combined into a single measure of dualism.  Therefore, in all 
analyses reported in the main text we only used the six dualism items, because (1) these 
questions most directly address whether participants believe minds to be separate from bodies 
and (2) the dualism subscale is typically more strongly correlated with the modeled variables 
(see Table 5). 
 
Table 5.  Bivariate correlations between mind-body dualism and mind-body monism and other 
variables, Study 1.  
 
 Canada India 
  Dualism Monism Dualism Monism 
Monism .15 -- .45 -- 
Intuition .28 .12 .18 .21 
Mentalizing .17 .05 .18 .15 
Teleology in life .36 .02 .33 .24 
Teleology in nature .20 .20 .33 .36 
Belief in Karma .45 .10 .35 .22 
Mind of Karma .35 .15 .33 .30 
Benevolence of karma .26 .13 .23 .22 
Punitiveness of karma .13 .07 .17 .18 
Impersonal karma .14 .03 .17 .14 
Resource-like karma .26 .16 .22 .20 
Belief in God .22 -.05 .16 .05 
Mind of God .20 .03 .23 .18 
Benevolence of God .23 .01 .24 .18 
Punitiveness of God .03 .06 .13 .14 
Impersonal God .06 .10 .17 .09 
Resource-like God .16 .10 .07 .16 
 
Note.  Any correlations > .06 are statistically significant at p < .05. 
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Study 1: Model separately predicting different karma beliefs and God beliefs 
Before creating the models described in the main text, we first analyzed the data through path 
models that separately predicted belief and each of the trait ascriptions from the cognitive 
variables.  These models, depicted in Figure 1, included correlated residuals between various 
belief and trait ratings, which give a sense of the associations between various karma/God 
beliefs.   Results are displayed in Tables 6 and 7.  The models presented in the main text further 
modify these models to add a direct path between belief in karma/God and traits ascribed to 
karma/God, to more explicitly test whether (a) belief (in general) is associated with particular 
representations of karma/God, and (b) whether cognitive variables predict endorsement of these 
representations above and beyond their relationship with belief. 
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Table 6.  Study 1: Standardized path model estimates predicting beliefs about karma and God. 
 Karma God 
 Canada India Canada India 
 b 95% CI b 95% CI b 95% CI b 95% CI 
Dualism         
Intuition 0.26*** [0.20, 0.32] 0.14*** [0.08, 0.21] 0.26*** [0.20, 0.32] 0.14*** [0.08, 0.21] 
Mentalizing 0.11*** [0.05, 0.17] 0.14*** [0.08, 0.21] 0.11*** [0.05, 0.17] 0.14*** [0.08, 0.21] 
Teleology in Life Events        
Intuition 0.24*** [0.19, 0.30] 0.27*** [0.21, 0.33] 0.24*** [0.19, 0.30] 0.27*** [0.21, 0.33] 
Mentalizing 0.16*** [0.10, 0.22] 0.17*** [0.11, 0.23] 0.16*** [0.10, 0.22] 0.17*** [0.11, 0.23] 
Teleology in Nature        
Intuition 0.11*** [0.05, 0.17] 0.20*** [0.14, 0.26] 0.11*** [0.05, 0.17] 0.20*** [0.14, 0.26] 
Mentalizing 0.12*** [0.06, 0.18] 0.14*** [0.08, 0.20] 0.12*** [0.06, 0.18] 0.14*** [0.08, 0.20] 
Belief in Karma/God        
Dualism 0.29*** [0.24, 0.34] 0.18*** [0.12, 0.23] 0.04 [-0.02, 0.10] 0.007 [-0.06, 0.07] 
Teleology in life 0.45*** [0.40, 0.50] 0.45*** [0.40, 0.50] 0.45*** [0.40, 0.51] 0.42*** [0.36, 0.47] 
Teleology in nature 0.01 [-0.04, 0.06] 0.06* [0.007, 0.12] 0.03 [-0.02, 0.09] 0.04 [-0.02, 0.10] 
Mind         
Dualism 0.22*** [0.16, 0.28] 0.21*** [0.15, 0.27] 0.03 [-0.03, 0.09] 0.07* [0.005, 0.12] 
Teleology in life 0.32*** [0.27, 0.38] 0.22*** [0.16, 0.27] 0.46*** [0.41, 0.51] 0.45*** [0.39, 0.50] 
Teleology in nature 0.03 [-0.03, 0.08] 0.14*** [0.08, 0.20] 0.02 [-0.03, 0.08] 0.05 [-0.01, 0.11] 
Benevolence        
Dualism 0.17*** [0.11, 0.23] 0.12*** [0.06, 0.18] 0.07* [0.008, 0.13] 0.08** [0.02, 0.14] 
Teleology in life 0.24*** [0.18, 0.30] 0.23*** [0.17, 0.29] 0.42*** [0.37, 0.48] 0.39*** [0.33, 0.44] 
Teleology in nature 0.04 [-0.02, 0.10] 0.11*** [0.04, 0.17] 0.04 [-0.01, 0.10] 0.10*** [0.04, 0.16] 
Punitiveness        
Dualism 0.04 [-0.03, 0.10] 0.10** [0.04, 0.17] -0.006 [-0.07, 0.06] 0.06 [-0.008, 0.13] 
Teleology in life 0.26*** [0.19, 0.32] 0.16*** [0.09, 0.22] 0.10** [0.03, 0.17] 0.13*** [0.06, 0.19] 
Teleology in nature -0.008 [-0.07, 0.05] 0.04 [-0.02, 0.11] 0.01 [-0.05, 0.07] 0.08* [0.01, 0.14] 
Impersonal        
Dualism 0.09* [0.02, 0.15] 0.12*** [0.06, 0.19] 0.07 [0.00, 0.14] 0.11*** [0.04, 0.17] 
Teleology in life 0.17*** [0.11, 0.24] 0.10** [0.03, 0.16] 0.01 [-0.05, 0.08] 0.09** [0.03, 0.16] 
COGNITIVE PATHWAYS TO KARMA AND GOD 78 
Teleology in nature -0.03 [-0.10, 0.03] 0.04 [-0.02, 0.11] -0.05 [-0.11, 0.02] 0.08* [0.01, 0.14] 
Resource         
Dualism 0.16*** [0.10, 0.23] 0.11*** [0.05, 0.18] 0.07* [0.004, 0.13] -0.007 [-0.07, 0.06] 
Teleology in life 0.26** [0.20, 0.32] 0.22*** [0.15, 0.28] 0.24*** [0.18, 0.31] 0.13*** [0.07, 0.20] 
Teleology in nature 0.02 [-0.04, 0.08] 0.10** [0.04, 0.16] 0.02 [-0.05, 0.08] 0.11*** [0.04, 0.17] 
Note.  *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Table 7.  Study 1: Correlated residuals from path model (presented in main text) predicting beliefs about karma and God.  All estimates > 0.06 
are statistically significant at p < .05. 
  Karma God 
  Canada India Canada India 
  estimate 95% CI estimate 95% CI estimate 95% CI estimate 95% CI 
Intuition Mentalizing 0.21 [0.15, 0.27] 0.22 [0.16, 0.28] 0.21 [0.15, 0.27] 0.22 [0.16, 0.28] 
Dualism Teleo. in life 0.30 [0.24, 0.35] 0.28 [0.22, 0.33] 0.30 [0.24, 0.35] 0.28 [0.22, 0.33] 
Dualism Teleo. in nature 0.16 [0.10, 0.22] 0.29 [0.24, 0.35] 0.16 [0.10, 0.22] 0.29 [0.24, 0.35] 
Teleo. in life Teleo. in nature 0.07 [0.007, 0.13] 0.20 [0.14, 0.26] 0.07 [0.007, 0.13] 0.20 [0.14, 0.26] 
Belief Mind 0.47 [0.43, 0.52] 0.26 [0.20, 0.32] 0.74 [0.71, 0.77] 0.52 [0.47, 0.56] 
Belief Benevolence 0.32 [0.26, 0.37] 0.26 [0.21, 0.32] 0.68 [0.64, 0.71] 0.35 [0.29, 0.40] 
Belief Punitiveness 0.24 [0.18, 0.29] 0.18 [0.12, 0.24] 0.05 [-0.02, 0.11] 0.08 [0.01, 0.14] 
Belief Impersonal 0.20 [0.14, 0.26] 0.14 [0.08, 0.20] -0.09 [-0.15, -0.03] 0.06 [-0.008, 0.12] 
Belief Resource 0.33 [0.28, 0.39] 0.19 [0.13, 0.25] 0.29 [0.24, 0.35] 0.14 [0.08, 0.20] 
Mind Benevolence 0.44 [0.39, 0.49] 0.32 [0.27, 0.38] 0.68 [0.65, 0.71] 0.35 [0.29, 0.40] 
Mind Punitiveness 0.40 [0.35, 0.45] 0.26 [0.20, 0.32] 0.17 [0.11, 0.23] 0.14 [0.08, 0.20] 
Mind Impersonal 0.29 [0.24, 0.35] 0.24 [0.18, 0.30] -0.01 [-0.07, 0.05] 0.07 [0.004, 0.13] 
Mind Resource 0.69 [0.66, 0.73] 0.55 [0.51, 0.60] 0.46 [0.41, 0.51] 0.37 [0.31, 0.42] 
Benevolence Punitiveness 0.38 [0.33, 0.43] 0.34 [0.29, 0.40] 0.12 [0.06, 0.18] 0.11 [0.05, 0.18] 
Benevolence Impersonal 0.29 [0.23, 0.35] 0.32 [0.27, 0.38] 0.02 [-0.05, 0.08] 0.09 [0.03, 0.15] 
Benevolence Resource 0.38 [0.33, 0.44] 0.23 [0.17, 0.29] 0.29 [0.23, 0.35] 0.05 [-0.008, 0.12] 
Punitiveness Impersonal 0.56 [0.52, 0.61] 0.49 [0.45, 0.54] 0.54 [0.50, 0.59] 0.43 [0.38, 0.48] 
Punitiveness Resource 0.26 [0.20, 0.32] 0.19 [0.13, 0.25] 0.17 [0.11, 0.23] 0.19 [0.13, 0.25] 
Impersonal Resource 0.20 [0.14, 0.26] 0.13 [0.07, 0.20] 0.15 [0.09, 0.21] 0.08 [0.02, 0.14] 
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Study 1:  Correlated residuals from main models 
Table 8.  Study 1: Correlated residuals from path model (presented in main text) predicting beliefs about karma and God.  All estimates > 0.06 
are statistically significant at p < .05. 
  Karma God 
  Canada India Canada India 
  estimate 95% CI estimate 95% CI estimate 95% CI estimate 95% CI 
Intuition Mentalizing 0.21 [0.15, 0.27] 0.22 [0.16, 0.28] 0.21 [0.15, 0.27] 0.22 [0.16, 0.28] 
Dualism Teleo. in life 0.30 [0.24, 0.35] 0.28 [0.22, 0.33] 0.30 [0.24, 0.35] 0.28 [0.22, 0.33] 
Dualism Teleo. in nature 0.16 [0.10, 0.22] 0.29 [0.24, 0.35] 0.16 [0.10, 0.22] 0.29 [0.24, 0.35] 
Teleo. in life Teleo. in nature 0.07 [0.01, 0.13] 0.2 [0.14, 0.26] 0.07 [0.01, 0.13] 0.20 [0.14, 0.26] 
Mind Benevolence 0.35 [0.29, 0.40] 0.2 [0.15, 0.26] 0.36 [0.31, 0.42] 0.27 [0.21, 0.33] 
Mind Punitiveness 0.34 [0.28, 0.39] 0.12 [0.06, 0.18] 0.20 [0.14, 0.26] 0.23 [0.17, 0.29] 
Mind Impersonal 0.23 [0.17, 0.29] 0.04 [-0.02, 0.11] 0.08 [0.02, 0.14] 0.21 [0.15, 0.27] 
Mind Resource 0.65 [0.61, 0.68] 0.35 [0.29, 0.40] 0.37 [0.32, 0.42] 0.53 [0.49, 0.57] 
Benevolence Punitiveness 0.33 [0.28, 0.39] 0.09 [0.03, 0.16] 0.12 [0.06, 0.18] 0.31 [0.25, 0.36] 
Benevolence Impersonal 0.25 [0.19, 0.30] 0.08 [0.02, 0.14] 0.10 [0.04, 0.17] 0.30 [0.24, 0.36] 
Benevolence Resource 0.31 [0.26, 0.37] 0.01 [-0.06, 0.07] 0.13 [0.07, 0.19] 0.19 [0.13, 0.25] 
Punitiveness Impersonal 0.54 [0.50, 0.59] 0.43 [0.38, 0.48] 0.55 [0.51, 0.59] 0.48 [0.44, 0.53] 
Punitiveness Resource 0.20 [0.14, 0.26] 0.18 [0.12, 0.24] 0.16 [0.10, 0.23] 0.16 [0.10, 0.22] 
Impersonal Resource 0.14 [0.08, 0.20] 0.07 [0.01, 0.13] 0.18 [0.12, 0.24] 0.11 [0.05, 0.17] 
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Study 2: Alternative models 
Predicting beliefs about God 
 
We tested additional models that were identical to those reported in text but excluded the social 
exposure variable, thus being comparable to the models tested in Study 1.  When predicting 
beliefs about God, this model was also a good fit for the data in the USA: χ2 (10) = 83.14, p 
< .001, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .077 [.062, .092], SRMR = .04, and explained 24% of the variance 
in belief in God, 23% of the variance in God’s moral knowledge, and 22% of the variance in 
agentic views.  This model was also a good fit predicting belief in God in Singapore: χ2 (10) = 
44.21, p < .001, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .082 [.058, .11], SRMR = .07, and explained 11% of the 
variance in belief in God, 4% of the variance in God’s moral knowledge, and 4% of the variance 
in agentic views.   
 
For the sake of comparison, alternative models that reversed the direction of the association 
between beliefs and cognitive biases provided a worse fit to the data when predicting belief in 
God in the USA: χ2 (8) = 172.45, p < .001, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .13 [.11, .15], SRMR = .052, 
and a similar (but no better) fit in Singapore: χ2 (8) = 47.32, p < .001, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .085 
[.059, .11], SRMR = .04.   
 
Predicting beliefs about karma 
 
When predicting belief in karma, the model omitting social exposure was also a good fit to the 
data in the USA: χ2 (7) = 76.32, p < .001, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .09 [.072, .11], SRMR = .04, and 
explained 34% of the variance in belief in karma, 13% of the variance in karma’s moral 
knowledge, 16% of the variance in agentic views, and 17% of the variance in non-agentic views 
of karma.  This model was also a good fit predicting belief in karma in Singapore: χ2 (6) = 25.63, 
p < .001, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .080 [.050, .11], SRMR = .03, and explained 21% of the variance 
in belief in karma, 15% of the variance in karma’s moral knowledge, 8% of the variance in 
agentic views, and 19% of the variance in non-agentic views of karma.  
 
For the sake of comparison, alternative models that reversed the direction of the association 
between beliefs and cognitive biases provided a fit that was similar or worse (depending on 
which fit statistic is considered) when predicting belief in karma in the USA: χ2 (4) = 64.71, p 
< .001, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .11 [.09, .14], SRMR = .03, and a similar fit in Singapore: χ2 (4) = 
16.62, p = .002, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .08 [.04, .12], SRMR = .02. 
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Study 2: Model separately predicting different karma beliefs and God beliefs 
Figure 2. Study 2: Path model predicting belief in karma.  Also not depicted are included correlated 
residuals between social exposure to karma and cognitive predictor variables. Dashed arrows indicate 
paths added to the karma model that were omitted from the model predicting God.  The path from 
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Table 9. Study 2: Standardized path model estimates predicting beliefs about karma and God. 
 Karma God 
 USA Singapore  USA Singapore 
 b 95% CI b 95% CI b 95% CI b 95% CI 
Dualism         
Analytic thinking -0.12*** [-0.17, -0.06] -0.04 [-0.13, 0.05] -0.12*** [-0.17, -0.06] -0.04 [-0.13, 0.05] 
Mentalizing 0.18*** [0.12, 0.23] 0.14** [0.05, 0.22] 0.18*** [0.12, 0.23] 0.14** [0.05, 0.22] 
Teleology in Life Events       
Analytic thinking -0.15*** [-0.21, -0.10] -0.04 [-0.13, 0.05] -0.15*** [-0.21, -0.10] -0.04 [-0.13, 0.05] 
Mentalizing 0.30*** [0.25, 0.35] 0.25*** [0.17, 0.33] 0.30*** [0.25, 0.35] 0.25*** [0.17, 0.33] 
Belief         
Dualism 0.18*** [0.13, 0.22] 0.20* [0.02, 0.18] -0.004 [-0.05, 0.05] 0.04 [-0.04, 0.12] 
Teleology in life 0.29*** [0.25, 0.34] 0.32*** [0.24, 0.39] 0.34*** [0.29, 0.39] 0.25*** [0.17, 0.33] 
Social Exposure 0.36*** [0.31, 0.40] 0.24*** [0.16, 0.32] 0.38*** [0.34, 0.43] 0.29*** [0.22, 0.37] 
Analytic thinking -0.11*** [-0.15, -0.07] -0.12** [-0.20, -0.05]     
Agency         
Dualism 0.11*** [0.05, 0.16] 0.10* [0.01, 0.18] -0.02 [-0.07, 0.02] 0.03 [-0.04, 0.09] 
Teleology in life 0.12*** [0.07, 0.18] 0.13* [0.04, 0.21] 0.30*** [0.25, 0.35] 0.14*** [0.07, 0.20] 
Social Exposure 0.41*** [0.36, 0.46] 0.14** [0.05, 0.23] 0.45*** [0.40, 0.49] 0.31*** [0.24, 0.39] 
Analytic thinking   -0.16*** [-0.22, -0.09]     
Moral knowledge        
Dualism 0.09*** [0.04, 0.14] 0.08 [-0.004, 0.16] -0.022 [-0.07, 0.03] 0.07* [0.003, 0.14] 
Teleology in life 0.20*** [0.15, 0.25] 0.28*** [0.20, 0.37] 0.33*** [0.28, 0.38] 0.13*** [0.06, 0.20] 
Social Exposure 0.36*** [0.31, 0.41] 0.20*** [0.12, 0.29] 0.39*** [0.35, 0.44] 0.30*** [0.22, 0.38] 
Non-agentic traits        
Dualism 0.11*** [0.06, 0.17] 0.09* [0.01, 0.17]     
Teleology in life 0.21*** [0.16, 0.26] 0.32*** [0.25, 0.40]     
Social Exposure 0.33*** [0.28, 0.38] 0.22*** [0.14, 0.30] 0.07* [0.01, 0.12] 0.24*** [0.16, 0.32] 
 
Note.  *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Table 10. Study 2: Correlated residuals from path model predicting beliefs about karma and God.  All estimates > 0.10 are statistically significant 
at p < .05. 
  Karma God   
USA Singapore USA Singapore 
  estimate 95% CI estimate 95% CI estimate 95% CI estimate 95% CI 
Analytic 
thinking 
Mentalizing -0.12 [-0.17, -0.06] 0.09 [0.01, 0.18] -0.12 [-0.17, -0.06] 0.10 [0.01, 0.18] 
Dualism Teleology in 
life 0.33 [0.28, 0.38] 0.24 [0.16, 0.33] 0.33 [0.28, 0.38] 0.24 [0.16, 0.34] 
Belief Agency 0.30 [0.25, 0.35] 0.18 [0.10, 0.26] 0.60 [0.56, 0.63] 0.36 [0.28, 0.44] 
Belief Moral 
knowledge 0.34 [0.30, 0.39] 0.28 [0.19, 0.36] 0.50 [0.45, 0.54] 0.30 [0.22, 0.38] 
Belief Non-agentic 0.36 [0.31, 0.40] 0.35 [0.27, 0.42] -0.08 [-0.14, -0.02] 0.16 [0.07, 0.25] 
Agency Moral 
knowledge 0.60 [0.56, 0.63] 0.65 [0.60, 0.70] 0.79 [0.77, 0.81] 0.78 [0.75, 0.82] 
Agency Non-agentic 0.58 [0.55, 0.62] 0.63 [0.58, 0.68] 0.17 [0.12, 0.23] 0.64 [0.58, 0.69] 
Moral 
knowledge 
Non-agentic 0.77 [0.75, 0.80] 0.74 [0.70, 0.78] 0.20 [0.14, 0.25] 0.58 [0.52, 0.64] 
Dualism Social 




Exposure 0.28 [0.23, 0.32] 0.29 [0.21, 0.36] 0.35 [0.31, 0.40] 0.25 [0.17, 0.33] 
Mentalizing Social 




Exposure -0.19 [-0.25, -0.14] 0.05 [-0.04, 0.14] -0.08 [-0.14, -0.03] -0.02 [-0.11, 0.06] 
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Study 2: Correlated residuals from main models 
Table 11. Study 2: Correlated residuals from path model predicting beliefs about karma and God.  All estimates > 0.10 are statistically significant 
at p < .05. 
  Karma God   
USA Singapore USA Singapore 
  estimate 95% CI estimate 95% CI estimate 95% CI estimate 95% CI 
Analytic 
thinking 
Mentalizing -0.12 [-0.17, -0.06] 0.09 [0.01, 0.18] -0.12 [-0.17, -0.06] 0.09 [0.01, 0.18] 
Dualism Teleology in 
life 0.33 [0.28, 0.38] 0.24 [0.16, 0.33] 0.33 [0.28, 0.38] 0.24 [0.16, 0.33] 
Agency Moral 
knowledge 0.55 [0.51, 0.59] 0.63 [0.58, 0.69] 0.70 [0.68, 0.73] 0.75 [0.72, 0.79] 
Agency Non-agentic 0.53 [0.49, 0.57] 0.62 [0.56, 0.67] 0.27 [0.22, 0.33] 0.63 [0.57, 0.68] 
Moral 
knowledge 
Non-agentic 0.74 [0.72, 0.77] 0.71 [0.67, 0.76] 0.27 [0.22, 0.33] 0.56 [0.50, 0.62] 
Dualism Social 




Exposure 0.27 [0.23, 0.32] 0.29 [0.21, 0.36] 0.35 [0.31, 0.40] 0.25 [0.17, 0.33] 
Mentalizing Social 




Exposure -0.19 [-0.24, -0.14] 0.05 [-0.04, 0.14] -0.08 [-0.14, -0.03] -0.02 [-0.11, 0.06] 
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Studies 1 and 2:  Controlling for god variables when predicting karma 
In addition to the path models that separately investigated predictors of God beliefs and 
predictors of karma beliefs, we conducted additional multiple regression analyses to investigate 
covariation between beliefs about God and beliefs in karma.  Specifically, we conducted multiple 
regression models that predicted each of the beliefs about karma from the cognitive variables 
(included in the path models in the main text) and the beliefs about god that were analogous to 
the karma questions.  These models, depicted in Table 8 and 9, show that beliefs about god 
predict analogous beliefs about karma (e.g., the degree of mind attributed to God predicts the 
degree of mind attributed to karma), indicating consistency in how individuals view different 
supernatural entities.  However, this covariation between beliefs about God and karma cannot 
account for the similarities between the cognitive predictors of karma and God.  The cognitive 
variables independently predict belief in karma even after controlling for belief in God, thereby 
confirming an independent association with belief in karma that cannot be accounted for by 
beliefs about God. 
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Table 12.  Study 1: Predicting beliefs about karma from cognitive tendencies and beliefs about God. 
 Canada  India 
  b CI p b CI p b CI p b CI p 
Belief in karma 
           
Intuition 0.09 0.03, 0.14 .001 0.09 0.04, 0.14 .001 0.10 0.04, 0.15 .001 0.11 0.05, 0.16 <.001 
Mentalizing -0.08 -0.13, -0.03 .003 -0.08 -0.13, -0.03 .002 0.04 -0.02, 0.09 .17 0.03 -0.02, 0.08 .28 
Dualism 0.28 0.22, 0.33 <.001 0.27 0.22, 0.32 <.001 0.17 0.11, 0.23 <.001 0.17 0.12, 0.23 <.001 
Teleology in 
life 
0.44 0.39, 0.50 <.001 0.42 0.37, 0.48 <.001 0.42 0.36, 0.48 <.001 0.32 0.26, 0.38 <.001 
Teleology in 
nature 
0.01 -0.04, 0.06 .58 0.01 -0.04, 0.06 .59 0.04 -0.01, 0.10 .13 0.03 -0.02, 0.08 .29 
Belief in God 
   
0.05 -0.01, 0.10 .11 
   
0.23 0.17, 0.29 <.001 
Mind                         
Intuition 0.07 0.01, 0.13 .016 0.09 0.03, 0.15 .003 0.07 0.01, 0.13 .015 0.07 0.01, 0.12 .025 
Mentalizing -0.08 -0.14, -0.02 .007 -0.09 -0.14, -0.03 .002 -0.15 -0.21, -0.09 <.001 -0.16 -0.21, -0.10 <.001 
Dualism 0.21 0.15, 0.28 <.001 0.21 0.15, 0.27 <.001 0.22 0.16, 0.28 <.001 0.2 0.14, 0.26 <.001 
Teleology in 
life 
0.32 0.26, 0.38 <.001 0.23 0.16, 0.29 <.001 0.22 0.16, 0.28 <.001 0.11 0.04, 0.18 .001 
Teleology in 
nature 
0.03 -0.03, 0.09 .29 0.03 -0.03, 0.08 .35 0.14 0.08, 0.20 <.001 0.13 0.07, 0.19 <.001 
Mind of God 
   
0.20 0.14, 0.26 <.001 
   
0.26 0.19, 0.32 <.001 
Benevolence                       
Intuition 0.06 0.00, 0.13 .049 0.09 0.02, 0.15 .007 0.06 -0.00, 0.12 .06 0.04 -0.02, 0.10 .25 
Mentalizing -0.02 -0.08, 0.04 .54 -0.05 -0.11, 0.01 .11 -0.06 -0.12, 0.00 .06 -0.08 -0.14, -0.02 .011 
Dualism 0.16 0.09, 0.22 <.001 0.14 0.07, 0.20 <.001 0.12 0.06, 0.19 <.001 0.10 0.04, 0.17 .001 
Teleology in 
life 
0.23 0.16, 0.29 <.001 0.13 0.06, 0.20 <.001 0.23 0.16, 0.29 <.001 0.12 0.06, 0.19 <.001 
Teleology in 
nature 
0.04 -0.02, 0.10 .18 0.04 -0.02, 0.09 .23 0.10 0.04, 0.17 .001 0.08 0.02, 0.14 .012 
Benevolence 
of God 
   0.24 0.18, 0.31 <.001    0.29 0.22, 0.35 <.001 
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 Canada  India 
  b CI p b CI p b CI p b CI p 
Punitiveness 
           
Intuition 0.02 -0.05, 0.08 .57 0.03 -0.03, 0.09 .27 0.00 -0.07, 0.06 .98 0.01 -0.05, 0.06 .81 
Mentalizing -0.11 -0.17, -0.04 .001 -0.06 -0.12, 0.00 .053 -0.15 -0.22, -0.09 <.001 -0.05 -0.11, 0.00 .057 
Dualism 0.04 -0.03, 0.11 .23 0.03 -0.03, 0.10 .28 0.11 0.05, 0.18 .001 0.08 0.02, 0.14 .008 
Teleology in 
life 
0.27 0.20, 0.34 <.001 0.23 0.17, 0.29 <.001 0.18 0.12, 0.25 <.001 0.10 0.04, 0.16 .001 
Teleology in 
nature 
0.00 -0.06, 0.07 .90 -0.01 -0.06, 0.05 .83 0.06 -0.01, 0.12 .075 0.01 -0.05, 0.07 .79 
Punitiveness 
of God 
   
0.34 0.28, 0.39 <.001 
   
0.49 0.43, 0.54 <.001 
Impersonal 
  
                      
Intuition 0.01 -0.06, 0.07 .84 0.01 -0.05, 0.07 .74 -0.04 -0.10, 0.03 .28 -0.02 -0.08, 0.04 .51 
Mentalizing -0.06 -0.12, 0.00 .063 -0.03 -0.09, 0.03 .28 -0.07 -0.13, -0.01 .029 -0.02 -0.08, 0.04 .56 
Dualism 0.09 0.02, 0.16 .009 0.08 0.01, 0.14 .02 0.13 0.06, 0.20 <.001 0.09 0.03, 0.15 .005 
Teleology in 
life 
0.18 0.11, 0.25 <.001 0.17 0.11, 0.23 <.001 0.12 0.05, 0.19 .001 0.07 0.01, 0.14 .023 
Teleology in 
nature 
-0.03 -0.09, 0.04 .42 -0.02 -0.08, 0.04 .54 0.05 -0.01, 0.12 .121 0.01 -0.05, 0.08 .65 
Impersonal 
God 
   
0.27 0.21, 0.33 <.001 
   
0.37 0.31, 0.43 <.001 
Resource-like                       
Intuition 0.10 0.03, 0.16 .002 0.10 0.04, 0.16 .001 0.07 0.01, 0.14 .021 0.06 -0.00, 0.12 .054 
Mentalizing -0.08 -0.14, -0.02 .007 -0.09 -0.14, -0.03 .005 -0.12 -0.18, -0.06 <.001 -0.10 -0.16, -0.04 .001 
Dualism 0.15 0.09, 0.22 <.001 0.14 0.08, 0.20 <.001 0.12 0.05, 0.18 <.001 0.12 0.06, 0.18 <.001 
Teleology in 
life 
0.26 0.19, 0.32 <.001 0.20 0.14, 0.27 <.001 0.22 0.15, 0.29 <.001 0.20 0.13, 0.26 <.001 
Teleology in 
nature 
0.03 -0.03, 0.08 .41 0.02 -0.04, 0.08 .48 0.10 0.04, 0.16 .002 0.08 0.01, 0.14 .016 
Resource-
like God 
   0.20 0.14, 0.26 <.001    0.20 0.14, 0.26 <.001 
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Table 13.  Study 2: Predicting beliefs about karma from cognitive tendencies and beliefs about God. 
 USA  Singapore 
  b CI p b CI p b CI p b CI p 
Belief in karma 
           
Analytic 
thinking 
-0.17 -0.21, -0.12 <.001 -0.17 -0.22, -0.12 <.001 -0.1 -0.18, -0.02 .012 -0.10 -0.18, -0.02 .017 
Mentalizing 0.07 0.02, 0.11 .008 0.07 0.02, 0.11 .007 0.00 -0.09, 0.08 .92 0.00 -0.08, 0.08 .97 
Dualism 0.26 0.21, 0.31 <.001 0.26 0.21, 0.31 <.001 0.15 0.06, 0.23 .001 0.14 0.05, 0.22 .001 
Teleology in 
life 
0.36 0.30, 0.41 <.001 0.38 0.33, 0.44 <.001 0.38 0.29, 0.46 <.001 0.34 0.25, 0.43 <.001 




                      
Intuition -0.16 -0.21, -0.10 <.001 -0.15 -0.20, -0.10 <.001 -0.14 -0.23, -0.06 .001 -0.15 -0.23, -0.07 <.001 
Mentalizing 0.09 0.04, 0.15 .001 0.09 0.03, 0.14 .002 0.01 -0.07, 0.10 .74 0.01 -0.08, 0.09 .90 
Dualism 0.19 0.13, 0.25 <.001 0.19 0.13, 0.24 <.001 0.13 0.04, 0.22 .003 0.08 -0.00, 0.16 .06 
Teleology in 
life 
0.17 0.12, 0.23 <.001 0.14 0.08, 0.21 <.001 0.17 0.08, 0.26 <.001 0.05 -0.04, 0.14 .26 
God’s non-
moral agency 
   0.07 0.01, 0.13 .018    0.41 0.33, 0.49 <.001 
Moral knowledge                       
Intuition -0.04 -0.10, 0.01 .10 -0.04 -0.09, 0.02 .19 -0.04 -0.12, 0.05 .39 -0.04 -0.12, 0.03 .23 
Mentalizing 0.13 0.07, 0.18 <.001 0.12 0.06, 0.17 <.001 0.15 0.06, 0.23 .001 0.13 0.05, 0.20 .001 
Dualism 0.17 0.11, 0.23 <.001 0.16 0.11, 0.22 <.001 0.12 0.03, 0.20 .007 0.04 -0.03, 0.12 .26 
Teleology in 
life 
0.24 0.18, 0.30 <.001 0.16 0.10, 0.23 <.001 0.31 0.22, 0.40 <.001 0.20 0.11, 0.28 <.001 
God’s moral 
knowledge 
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 USA  Singapore 
  b CI p b CI p b CI p b CI p 
Non-agentic 
traits 
           
Intuition -0.06 -0.11, -0.01 .025 -0.07 -.12, -.02 .007 0.04 -0.04, 0.12 .36 0.03 -0.04, 0.10 .42 
Mentalizing 0.17 0.11, 0.22 <.001 0.19 .14, .24 <.001 0.11 0.03, 0.19 .008 0.10 0.03, 0.18 .009 
Dualism 0.19 0.13, 0.24 <.001 0.13 .07, .18 <.001 0.13 0.05, 0.21 .002 0.08 0.01, 0.16 .034 
Teleology in 
life 
0.24 0.18, 0.30 <.001 0.24 .18, .29 <.001 0.37 0.28, 0.45 <.001 0.31 0.23, 0.39 <.001 
God’s non-
agentic traits 
   0.26 .21, .31 <.001    0.33 0.25, 0.41 <.001 
 
 
 
